



As a new tool in the forecasting business, predic tion 
markets operate in areas current forecasting techno lo­
gies can hardly compete with. Even traditional opini­
on polls carried out online do not offer aspects like 
the real time operation a continuous market system can 
provide. Additionally, prediction markets provide a 
high involvement of the trader, usually not present or 
even achievable by traditional prediction tools. But as 
prediction markets are implemented with play money in 
open world scenarios, they may suffer from a gambling 
character where the system and results could be consi­
dered as not being systematically serious. This impres­
sion is strengthened further if the market predictions 
are wrong. So as prediction markets achieve more public 
interest and gain attractiveness, it is essential that 
they provide clear predictions and, are therefore re­
cognised as a valid and serious forecasting tool. The 
essential aspect in providing an attractive and well 
functioning prediction market system is incentive com­
patibility. Fraud and manipulation are the systematic 
results of incentive incompatibility, which, if pre­
sent, have to be detected and balanced. This can be 
accomplished by sufficient arrangements to increase the 
cost of carrying out these manipulative actions.
This work gives a new way of detecting irregular tra­
ding behaviour by means of a generalised eigensystem 
analysis technique, used mainly in the area of the so­
cial network analysis. Derived from incentive incompa­
ti ble situations, the motivations for manipulations 
are described on a formal level. The manipulations are 
expressed as abstract trading patterns which can be de­
tected in certain types of transaction networks within 
a prediction market system.
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In comparison to social systems in former times where opinions of people were not
accepted in or allowed for political decisions our western social life nowadays builds
on valuations of individuals in a multitude of areas. For a democratic and plural
society the voice of people is crucial to the continuity of the system definition itself.
The valuations of small groups may decide about the flavour of politics i.e. are the
decisive factor for a party joining the parliament or not. To derive the public opin-
ion from individuals’ beliefs all individuals can be asked to state their individual
opinion which is done e.g. in ballots or polls [Noel 05]. Besides the correct detection
of the public opinion itself, public interest also lies in having a foreknowledge of
the result of an event if the formal aggregation is proceeded at a later date i.e. in
an upcoming election. As conducting the full information sampling by raising all
individual opinions (e.g. in an election) is in most cases very costly, this knowledge
is usually built by information aggregation techniques which usually take only the
opinions of a representative sample of the population responding with their true
opinions [Bohm 99]. Usually, this is undertaken by surveys via various kinds of me-
dia. Recently a new method for predicting a full information aggregation’s outcome
has been devised. Following the efficient market hypothesis of Friedrich Hayek, all
relevant information within a stock market is aggregated by the mechanism of a
perfect market and is revealed and disseminated in the prices which is referred to
as the price system [Haye 45, Muth 61]. As Eugene Fama states, the share prices
within an efficient market continuously reflect the sum of all available and relevant
information about future events [Fama 65]. Compared to a conventional survey, an
information stock market system on the opinion poll’s topic aggregates the traders’
opinions while the prices reflect the aggregation of these opinions as the prediction
of the market. Instead of asking a representative set of survey respondents for their
own individual opinion on their own vote the information market asks its traders
about their opinion on the electorate’s votes, so which opinion the deciders will have.
This concept was first described by Forsythe [Fors 92] and mechanises the idea of
deriving a more adequate answer to a question by aggregating the suggestions of a
set of people by means of an information market rather than by asking an expert or
conducting a survey [Suro 04].
2 1. Motivation
Within the literature such information systems are addressed by different terms like
decision markets, information markets, idea futures, forecasting markets, idea stocks,
information aggregation mechanisms or virtual stock markets [Tzir 07a, Tzir 07b].
Following the Hayek hypothesis of an efficient market the price system harnesses the
selfish motivations of the buyers and sellers into a socially efficient outcome reaching
a competitive allocation under neoliberal assumptions [Milg 92]. In a prediction
market, incentive compatibility is defined as follows:
1. The traders expect more gains from the system by participating in the system
than from not participating (they participate voluntarily) and
2. by revealing their true preference in the market the players earn more than by
manipulation (they tell the truth).
If incentive compatibility holds in a prediction market, participating in the market
and trading based on their honest expectations is a dominant strategy for rational
traders in the market, because deviations from this strategy will result in monetary
losses. Deficits within the incentive system of a stock market usually result in unde-
sirable actions e.g. fraudulent actions like insider trading if traders have the chance
to reach a higher return by following their fraudulent actions rather than by playing
by the rules.
As in conventional stock markets, where the “estimation” for a company’s value
within its environment is traded, also prediction markets have to deal with disrep-
utable traders that behave in a way that is illegal according to the actual market
rules. First and foremost this is certainly the abuse of insider knowledge and the
(fraudulent) buy and sell actions connected to it.
But in contrast to traditional stock markets, prediction markets may in many cases
be conducted without a direct monetary incentive, i.e. there is no direct dependency
between virtual stock market money and real money. The monetary incentive is
usually substituted by some prizes to be won by the traders with the highest depot
values after the market is finished and cleared. Within the market the traders
then deal with virtual play money they are provided with when entering a new
market (liquidity). As there is no monetary loss resulting from illegal decisions and
actions in play money settings, the incentive compatibility of the market is strongly
influenced, because cheating may lead to monetary gains in a play money market
by e.g. increasing the chances of a player to win a price by using multiple accounts
(“cheating” against the market rules) for money transfer.
This market setting generates other types of fraudulent actions not present in con-
ventional stock markets. As the liquidity of the market is virtually generated by
giving the play money to the traders for free, alliances among traders or multiple
virtual identities of a single (human) trader provide an easy way to increase one’s de-
pot value besides regular market actions [Douc 02]. Here the motivation is egoistic,
i.e. to win the prize and against the rules.
But prediction markets’ problems are not only based on the virtuality of the traded
money. Also the virtuality and the real world as its essential counterpart create
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serious problems for a prediction market’s incentive system. Some traders in such a
prediction market setting could have an interest in influencing the market in favour
of the real event represented by some share (signalling). Basically, these traders
assume that the decision makers of the real event recognise a share’s price as the
majority opinion and, e.g. the decision makers may follow that signal in case of price
changes by changing their vote thus rallying to the majority opinion (Bandwagon
Effect, see [Nade 93, Rhod 07]). Therefore, the manipulator attempts to influence
the share’s price by systematic buys or sells of large quantities of shares hoping
to influence the decisions of traders in the real world. In contrast to the former
manipulations, these manipulations do not always aim at personal profit. In fact,
they have the rational intention to make collective profit in the real world by bearing
costs within the virtual market i.e. costs of contributing to the own party reaching
a certain percentage in an election vs. winning a price in the market system by
effective (regular) trading.
Both the ’egoistic’ and the ’signalling’ behaviour emanate from perturbations in the
incentive system. Manipulations result in growing dissatisfaction and abstinence
of participants in the worst case. They may also discredit the medium prediction
market as such by the disturbed confidence and reliability due to manipulated pre-
dictions. Manipulated predictions may also lead to high prediction errors. Trading
systems that allow participants to carry out manipulative actions or whose fraud-
ulent actions are simply not prevented from being carried out result in negative
feedback loops by attracting even more malicious traders or they incentivise (frus-
trated) regular traders to become fraudulent thus maybe multiplying the effects.
As the numbers of users participating in such electronic markets are quite high, a
manual supervision of the user accounts is simply impossible and algorithmic ap-
proaches are preferable. An idea of the ratio of fraudulent traders within systems
without active fraud prevention can be extracted from the official consumer com-
plaints within the early days of electronic auction markets in the United States
where the Federal Trade Commission registered a total of 51,000 auction fraud com-
plaints in 2002 [Comm 03] which in 2003 accounted for 48 % of Internet-related
fraud complaints and in sum resulted in the presumed loss of USD 437 million in
2003 [Comm 04, Comm 08].
In general, an electronic market system acts as a managing instance organising the
traders actions in matching buy and sell orders. The traders, therefore, interact with
the market system and not with each other directly which provides anonymity among
the traders. As most of the manipulation approaches by the participants violate this
anonymity assumption for the networks derived from these anonymous transaction
ties, this work focuses on the network connections seen as interconnections “among
the traders”. Thereby the status of a participant of a network is assumed to be
related to the status of all other participants in the network. As this idea is the
essential paradigm within the research area of social network analysis we analyse the
market by means of a social network analysis technique. Regarded from this side,
market manipulations can be seen as structures within a network that basically has
an unstructured characteristic.
So in the end maintaining incentive compatibility of the market system is crucial
to ensure an efficient market system and for prediction markets to provide reliable
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predictions. Due to aspects like market design e.g. a play money setting and the real
world embedding of a prediction market (corresponding to a real world event which
is to be predicted) this status of incentive compatibility cannot always be assured or
it is even impossible i.e. if the incentive system of the real world cannot be changed.
The detection of manipulations and the elimination of the manipulative traders can
help to balance the system if incentive compatibility cannot fully be established by
design of the system for the market rules and regulations. In addition, the detection
of manipulations improves market efficiency.
1.1 Objectives
The main objective of this thesis is the description and detection of fraudulent
trading patterns within prediction markets by means of a social network analysis
technique, namely eigensystem analysis. Thereby basic fraudulent patterns within
a prediction market are identified and classified with respect to the incentives of
the traders and the prediction market system. The chosen analysis technique is
adapted to the focus of this work and automatic procedures are described. These
are necessary, because real-life electronic markets produce networks that are too
large for manual analysis.
1.2 Outline
Following the motivation and this outline, Chapter 2 introduces prediction markets
and gives an insight into the relevant research areas in the domain of prediction
markets and the manipulations within such markets. Along with a detailed example
the basic functionality of a prediction market is introduced in Section 2.1. There-
upon an outline of applications of prediction markets in its rather short history is
given in Section 2.2, with the most prominent research and company internal mar-
kets mentioned. A literature overview in Section 2.3 categorises manipulations in
traditional stock markets and describes types of manipulation specific to prediction
markets. The work describing reasons for these manipulations to happen is given as
well as the effects on the market caused by these manipulations. On the basis of the
described related work the contribution of this work is described.
Chapter 3 describes the concept of incentive compatibility, the incentive structure
of a prediction market system, and the manipulations as a result of the absence of
incentive compatibility. Therefore, Section 3.1 describes incentive compatibility and
its conditions for a prediction market system. The incentive systems of such markets
are introduced in Section 3.2 with a focus on different scenarios a prediction market
can be conducted within. Fraudulent actions and the connected trading patterns are
derived from an incentive incompatible status of the market system in Section 3.3.
After having given insight in the basic assumption of anonymity within a market
network in Section 3.4 a short insight into fraud detection systems used within the
domain is given in Section 3.5 along with a discussion of the contribution of the
fraud detection techniques presented in this work.
As the main analysis technique used in this work stems from social network analysis,
Chapter 4 introduces this field and related research areas that are important to un-
derstand the interpretation of the formal results from the analysis technique. First,
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two formal representations of a social network are introduced in Section 4.1 (matrix)
and Section 4.2 (Graph). Section 4.3 describes basic measures on a graph used in the
following work to describe structures within the network. Social network analysis
techniques in the area of the used analysis technique is introduced in Section 4.4. In
Section 4.5 topics relevant to these areas and the interpretation of the results of the
applied analysis technique are introduced in brief.
For the analysis technique used Chapter 5 then gives the mathematical background.
As the method, namely eigensystem analysis of complex Hermitian matrices, works
in Hilbert space, the properties of Hermitian matrices are given in Section 5.1 with a
special focus on metrics in Hilbert space. In Section 5.2 the representation of transac-
tion networks as Hermitian matrices is described. The results from the eigensystem
calculation is discussed in depth in Section 5.3. As eigensystems tend to appear quite
complex in presentation a visualisation method is introduced. Structures within the
eigensystem are described and a clustering with the eigensystem is introduced as a
method of finding these patterns on the basis of the previously introduced metrics
within Hilbert space.
The analysis in Chapter 6 brings together the prediction market transaction data,
the analysis technique, and its capabilities of detecting certain structures within a
network. In Section 6.1 several transaction networks are generated from the market’s
accounting system and its transaction records with respect to the pattern structures
detectable by the introduced analysis method. Section 6.2 describes the introduced
manipulation patterns in terms of these networks based on the patterns introduced
in Section 3.3. Applying the analysis techniques from Section 5.3 to the networks
described within this chapter, Section 6.3 gives structured procedures for the appli-
cation and parametrisation.
Chapter 7 then applies these analysis ideas to market simulations and real world
data. In Section 7.1 a regular market scenario is built which then is perturbed
by defined transaction networks representing the introduced market manipulations.
Along with several simulation runs on different perturbations the stability of the
eigensystems can be shown. For the perturbations and their detection within the
eigensystem stable boundaries of the spectrum-changes are exemplarily given. In
the second part of this chapter the analysis methods are applied to transaction data
from several prediction markets which were conducted between the years 2006 and
2007. After a short description of the basic parameters of the markets, Section 7.2
analyses the market data by means of the introduced techniques with each market
having a special focus on one of each of the introduced manipulation patterns.
Closing remarks and an outlook to further work to be done within the addressed




To foresee the outcome of an uncertain future event or a hardly predictable develop-
ment prediction markets can be used where a stock market is set up for the event on
which the outcomes of the event are represented by the shares which are tied to them
with a certain payoff (e.g. the proportional voting portion of a party in an election,
the probability of the victory of a certain team or the sales figures of a product). In
the moment before the first information on the real outcome of the event is made
public, the market is closed. When the real outcome is known, the shares held by
the traders are priced and bought back for the final value of the shares. The final
value of a share can either be tied relative to the outcome of the election event e.g. x
monetary units for the share that made x percent in the election (relative payoff),
binary bound to the winning team at a sports event e.g. 100 monetary units for the
winning team (binary payoff), zero for all other or tied to the absolute value of the
event’s value e.g. one monetary unit for each 1000 units sold of a product (absolute
payoff). Table 2.1 lists the possible payoff functions for prediction markets.
In Figure 2.1 this functioning is illustrated by a trader having a certain estimation
of the outcome of an election event (1). In the beginning the trader holds 20 shares
of Share1 which gives a total depot value of 220 Euro (2) at the current market price
of 11 Euro for Share1 he bought them for (1). Now in (3) the share prices change to
13 Euro for Share1 and 29 Euro for Share2. As the trader assumes the share Share2
to be underrated he decides to buy 30 shares of Share2 (4). This gives a new total
depot value of 1130 Euro. He also decides to sell all shares of Share1 which gives
him a profit of 2 ∗ 20 = 40 Euro as he bought the shares for 11 Euro per share and
leaves the share portfolio’s value at 870 Euro (5). In (6) the election day brought up
the real outcome of the election with the party of Share1 having 10 % and the party
of Share2 having 36 % of the total votes. This results in the system paying 10 Euro
for every share of Share1 and 36 Euro for every share of Share2 and a total depot
value after buyback of 1080 Euro (7) and a total speculative profit of 250 Euro for
the trader.
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Outcome of the election
as assumed by the trader:
Share1 : 12 %
Share2 : 34 %
New share prices:
Share1 : 13 €
Share2 : 29 €
Real outcome
of the election:
Share1 : 10 %
Share2 : 36 %
Figure 2.1: Trading in a prediction market system
Basis for the prediction market is the primary market (a fixed-price portfolio market)
where traders can buy and sell a set of one share each (called a portfolio) for a
fixed price without risk. E.g. in a political stock market where the result of an
election is traded the portfolio consisting of one share for each party within the
market costs 100 monetary units. In the secondary market (e.g. a continuous double
auction market) the traders exchange these shares among each other with respect
to their preferences. Within this setting the prediction market describes a zero-
sum game with the given virtual money being redistributed among the traders. In
play-money markets traders are usually not confronted with losses of real money, but
with bankruptcy in the play money leading to the stop of all trading actions because
of the lack of liquidity. The secondary market is usually designed as a continuous
double auction matching buy and sell orders in the moment they overlap. Due to
the low level of trading activities in the beginning of a market the initial phase of a
market may be organised by a clearinghouse auction where the orders are collected
until a certain point in time is reached. A market price is calculated and all queuing
orders that overlap are matched and executed at a uniform price. This phase is then
followed by the continuous double auction.
Hence the market price of a share at market closure reflects the aggregated perception
of the traders for the probability of realising the event. This final forecast stands for
the market’s prediction itself and is often referred to as the market result which is
compared to the outcome of the real life event. Also at each point in time during the
trading, i.e. in the period where the shares’ final values are unknown, the probability
of occurence or expectations of the traders for that event to come true can be derived
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from the price of the corresponding share and this price reflects the continuous
prediction of the traders about the outcome of the event. During the market, prices
within the market and the perception of the outcome of the real event may influence
each other [Schm 02].
The process resulting in the probabilities of the prediction market is conducted by
rational, risk neutral traders selling shares which they estimate to be overvalued
(i.e. the final price being lower than the current one) and buying shares which they
estimate to be undervalued [Glos 85]. So the price of a share converges at a price
level reflecting the aggregated preference of the traders for that share. Thereby the
preferences of a trader correspond to his discounted expectations. In short term
markets the discounting can be neglected [Span 03]. Several payoff functions can be
used to generate different kinds of predictions where the payoff functions define how
the final value of the shares are measured [Span 03, Wolf 04]. The most important
payoff functions are listed in Table 2.1. The election market example above described
a relative payoff for each share as seen in the bottom row of Table 2.1. The payoff is
relative to the total opinion variation of 100% for all parties and directly bound to
the percentage of the result the party achieves in the election. So with this payoff
the system will buy back all shares held by traders into virtual money at the rate
given by the parties’ election percentage.
Predicting the outcome of a soccer tournament a relative payoff could be expressed
by fixed virtual money values at which shares of certain teams are bought back in
the case of reaching a certain place in the tournament i.e. 80 monetary units for
each share reaching the first place, 50 for the second place and 20 for the third.
But for the sake of clarity, the market design for such markets usually utilises a
binary payoff described in the first row of Table 2.1 buying back the winning team’s
shares for 100 monetary units after market closure (end of final game). This type
of markets are sometimes referred to as winner-take-all markets where the share of
the realised event is denoted as winner. The middle row in Table 2.1 shows a payoff
by absolute numbers which can be illustrated by a prediction market for a certain
derivative and the market question asking for the price of the derivative at a certain
due date. After market closure all shares are bought back for the actual course of
the derivative in the real world. Within prediction market settings especially this
type of payoff brings certain problems when used in a real money market where the
number of traders and especially the real money they are able to buy shares for is
not limited. The payoffs in this scenario are decoupled so depending on the price
evolution of the derivative in the real world, the payoffs for the system in such a
setting may become unlimited. Thus it could be safer for the market operator to use
a binary payoff where the courses are classified into shares like “higher than value
x at the due date td” and “lower than value x at the due date td” and the winning
shares being bought back for a certain amount of money after market closure.
In the choice of the payoff function it should generally be paid attention to the
traders’ valuations for the share. Especially, in settings where a binary or absolute
payoff is used together with long period markets, it may be difficult for the traders to
value the initial price or prices at all as the measures are not known from everyday
life and appear to be artificial (in comparison to an election event measured in
percentual shares). Complex for the traders to evaluate are also long time spans,
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Function
of Disbursement
Range of Values Examples for the
Market Design




- Market share of 30%,
between 30-35% or above
35% at due date
Absolute numbers 0 - maximal possible
value of the market con-
dition
- Sales of a product in a
certain period
- Number of visitors of a
movie
Relative numbers
(Sum of prices of one
share each result in a
fixed portfolio value)
0 - 100 - Market share of differ-
ent products in the same
segment/competing
products
- Share of 100% for a
party within an election
Table 2.1: Payoff functions for prediction markets (based on [Span 07b])
i.e. in a market setting which asks for the company’s stock price one-year-ahead.
The resulting volatility of the market may build a base for upcoming fraudulent
actions as described in Section 6.2 if it is not based on high trading activity.
As most of the stock markets today are based on electronic communication within the
market system also prediction markets are usually operated as electronic markets.
Information technology is used by the market system to bring buyers and sellers
together on a virtual market place. There the traders leave buy or sell offers (asks
in case of the intention to buy and bids in case of the intention to sell shares).
In most systems the traders are allowed to act from locations of personal choice
as communication is conducted with internet connections. For some experimental
scenarios the locations may be next to each other limited by the network connection.
Normally in electronic markets traders interact with the market on screen without
any direct physical connection to each other.
2.2 Application and Research Areas
Following betting markets at Wall Street on the outcome of presidential elections
in the years after 1884 [Rhod 04] in 1988 the Iowa Electronic Market ran as the
the first major electronic prediction market for the 1988 U.S. presidential elections
[Fors 92] in the way described in Section 2.1. After several years of mainly political
focus and predicting election outcomes the first business application of prediction
markets have evolved with a market for completion dates of large scale software
projects at Siemens in 1997 [Ortn 97, Ortn 98] and markets to predict the sales
volume of printers at Hewlett-Packard from 1996 to 1999 [Plot 02]. Up to now
several other application areas of prediction markets evolved like predicting the
Oscar award winners [Lama 07] or the outcome of sports events like soccer matches
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and tournaments [Span 07a] which follow a long tradition of sports betting over the
last century (i.e. sweepstakes, horsetrack race betting).
Since the beginning of prediction market research the main interest lies in the ac-
curacy of the predictions. Starting with accuracy with respect to the real event’s
outcome and, therefore, the reliability of the idea of prediction markets itself, the fo-
cus nowadays changed to accuracy of the prediction in comparison to predictions of
other forecasting media (i.e. surveys, betting markets) [Schm 02, Luck 07] or other
auction types [Geye 07]. Of special interest is the influence of these parameters in
the market’s share prices and, therefore, the predictions [Schm 02]. Besides these
parameters adjustable and fixed within the technical market system, a prediction
market system essentially consists also of the (human) traders and a set of market
rules. Market rules can be described as the totality of the legal and contractual rules
and regulations that traders must observe in order to ensure that the market oper-
ates in an orderly fashion. The market’s share prices and therefore the predictions
are manipulated by traders not obeying these market rules.
2.3 Manipulation of Prediction Markets
In the literature markets are widely regarded as being more accurate for extract-
ing diffuse information than other techniques like surveys or opinion polls [Fors 92,
Chen 04, Hans 06a]. But this accuracy can be compromised by information traps
(information existing in the market does not become revealed in prices, [Nth 99]),
lack of liquidity, lack of meaningful equilibria or manipulation [Chen 04] which for
the (human) trader’s side results in behaviour like lying, manipulation, embezzle-
ment, retribution, or system manipulation (sabotage) [Hans 06a].
Classification
In their empirical work on stock price manipulation Allen and Gale classify the field
of manipulations in stock markets and give examples referred to in the following and
based on the classification made by the United States Securities Act of 1934 [Alle 92].
In this classification manipulations fall into one or several of the categories
1. Action based manipulation.
2. Information based manipulation.
3. Trade based manipulation.
By action based manipulation traders try to change the perceived or actual value
of assets. This may be achieved by a company communicating strategic decisions
which it is aware of not taking them in the end (cp. 1863 Harlem Railway case. The
New York City Council passed an ordinance allowing the Harlem Railway to build
a streetcar system along Broadway which made the stock price rise from $50 to $75.
Council members conspired and bought stock shortly before repealing the ordinance
and trying to cover the short positions to their favour.), or achieved by even changing
the companies’ active environment in strategic manners with the plan of restoring it
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to the original setting after the effects are visible in the market (cp. 1901 American
Steel and Wire case. The company’s managers shortened the company’s stocks and
closed the steel mills. The stock price fell after announcing the closures but rose
again when the company announced the reopening of the mills after the managers
covered their positions.).
In information based manipulation the manipulation is based on releasing false in-
formation or spreading false rumours as done for example by journalists writing in
favour of a certain trading pool or certain shares (cp. Levinson Curtis case. The
pool manager Levinson conspired with the journalist Curtis who wrote a financial
column in the New York Daily News in favour of the pool managed by Levinson
making over $1 million per year).
Trade based manipulation is conducted by simply buying and selling shares without
taking any publicly observable actions to alter the true value of the company or
releasing false information to change the price. Allen and Gale state that simply
“buying high” and “selling low” fits into this type of manipulation, although on the
face of it, this behaviour does not fit into the basic assumption of manipulations being
profitable - in fact these actions are just the reverse of what is required to make profit.
But they also show that this type of manipulation can theoretically be profitable in
an efficient market with rational traders if the traders have incomplete information
about other traders and their intentions of trading (whether these intentions are
manipulative or not).
The Securities Act aimed at the elimination of these manipulations in stock markets
by e.g. making it illegal for directors and officers to sell short the securities of their
own firm (action based manipulation) or requiring companies to issue information
to the public on a regular basis so that the spreading of rumours would be more
difficult (information based manipulations).
Occurrences
Manipulations described by Allen and Gale are traditionally defined as an attempt
to profit from artificially changing stock prices. These manipulations focus on the
goal of investor profits. In their recapitulation of manipulations within prediction
markets of a Century of Observational Data Rhode and Strumpf especially focus on
market prices as a general indicator for manipulations which reflect both, traditional
market manipulations and those in prediction markets [Rhod 07]. In contrast to the
main objective for manipulations in traditional financial markets (seeking profit)
prediction markets have a richer set of motives for being manipulated. They argue
that manipulators in prediction markets may be willing to accept losses if this has
large and lasting effects on prices, thus hoping for real world deciders to reckon this
prices as true prediction (see super-game in Section 3.2).
In their survey manipulations like large price jumps with initial price changes, ap-
peared in all analysed prediction markets (1880-1944 Presidential Election Markets
at Wall Street, 1988-present Iowa Electronic Market, and 2001-present TradeSports
market), whether in markets where traders revealed their offers to publicity (pub-
lic markets) or in markets where traders acted anonymously (anonymous markets).
Other authors reported also successful price manipulations in a real life political
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stock market [Hans 04a] as well as unsuccessful ones in real life racetrack betting
markets [Came 98], in real life prediction markets [Rhod 04], and in experimental
prediction markets [Hans 06b].
For trade based manipulations Allen and Gale bring in a theory of manipulation via
signalling. Due to their model a manipulative trader acts successful in imitating a
well-informed insider within a surrounding of traders with rational expectations if
the manipulative intentions of the manipulator are not revealed [Alle 92]. Bohm and
Sonnegaard describe the vulnerability of prediction markets by coalitions performing
circular trading [Bohm 99]. They describe that a coalition member A could offer a
large number of shares to the market at a very low price and a coalition member
B immediately afterwards purchases all standing offers. At a later date with higher
prices in the same share, coalition member B offers to sell all shares at very high
prices and coalition member B immediately accepts buying all standing shares. This
procedure is particularly attractive when the queue of bids is short in the times of
both actions. Hansen et al. [Hans 04a] describe an incentive for manipulation in a
prediction market (i) which is covered by the media and (ii) in which a decisive vote
illusion can be created. They present the behavioural model in Figure 2.2 as a basis
for this type of manipulation. The figure shows the rationale of a political stock
market without (left) and with (right) coverage by mass media. They argue that
even if the probability of a single vote having a decisive influence in the outcome of
the real world event is infinitesimal small (see e.g. Owen and Grofman [Owen 84]), a
surrounding in which a vote illusion is present - i.e. the real world deciders believe in
the influence of their vote - can occur. Together with a extensive mass media coverage
this motivates the above mentioned acceptance for manipulators to take even losses
for changing a share’s price which Hansen et al. call the ’circle of influence’.
Consequences of manipulations
In terms of the long term change of prices which is traditionally assumed as be-
ing intended by stock price manipulation, Rhode and Strumpf as well as Wolfers
and Zitzewitz find out that the effects of the manipulative actions are rather small
[Rhod 07, Wolf 04]. Furthermore, Hansen et al. state that as the endowments of
traders are finite the influence of trade based manipulations on market prices i.e. by
traders buying shares to hold up the price can only partly be neutralised by just one
rational trader [Hans 04a]. So effects of price manipulations are rather short-term
[Wolf 04]. In historical data Rhode and Strumpf did not even find any effect of
manipulating prices with trades [Rhod 04]. On the long term even positive effects
on the accuracy of prices due to prediction market manipulations are reported by
Hanson et al. [Hans 06b, Hans 06a, Hans 04b]. Besides as Rhode and Strumpf state,
it is difficult and expensive to manipulate prediction markets beyond short periods
[Rhod 07].
As Kyle, Spiegel and Subrahmanyam, and Hansen argue the market will be more
accurate in its prediction as price manipulations result in a larger trading volume
and more noise trading which compensates for the manipulative actions [Kyle 89,
Spie 92, Hans 06a]. More behavioural aspects are introduced by Barzel and Sil-
berberg who claim that a manipulated surrounding, that proper traders are aware
of, results in an increase of the idea that the next vote is crucial and therefore
























Figure 2.2: Rationale of a political stock market without (left) and with (right,
’circle of influence’) coverage by mass media as depicted by Hansen et al. [Hans 04a]
the tendency to vote increases [Barz 73]. Following Hansen and Oprea also the
opinions of traders seem more precise in an exceptional setting like a manipulated
surrounding [Hans 04b]. In one of the first laboratory works on price manipulations
in asset markets Hanson et al. report that manipulators submit higher bids than
non-manipulators [Hans 06b]. In an experimental setting Hanson and Oprea find
out that the mean of the manipulator’s target price has no effect on prices whereas
its variance increases the average price accuracy by raising the returns to informed
trading and the incentives for traders to become informed [Hans 04b].
Due to Hanson et al. the overall information aggregation properties of prediction
markets, the accuracy of the prices, and the correlation of the prices with the true,
real world informational states are not harmed by the presence of manipulators
[Hans 06b]. Manipulation seems indeed ineffective, if the presence of manipulation
(price bias) is suspected and the direction is known. Non-manipulators in this case
tend to accept contracts at lower prices as they seem not to do in a treatment where
they don’t suspect manipulative traders to exist. The bias from manipulation is
therefore compensated by traders without manipulation incentives who have different
thresholds at which they are willing to accept trades.
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At least initial changes in prices due to manipulation are measurable in any ma-
nipulated setting [Rhod 07]. Manipulation tends to be a problem when all traders
are very risk averse or when the harm from price errors correlates in unusual ways
with manipulation errors [Hans 06a]. Also market characteristics like largeness and
thickness, small number of possible outcomes or diversity of opinions seem to influ-
ence the ability of malicious traders to manipulate a market [Rhod 07]. As policy
makers use information from prediction markets to motivate decisions, also Hanson
et al. conclude that some individuals (manipulators) may be willing to take capital
losses in these markets in order to distort the informativeness of prices and thereby
indirectly control and influence policy [Hans 06b].
Summary
If the initially presented categories referred to manipulations in traditional stock
markets, then they are nevertheless applicable to prediction markets. The manipu-
lation types specific to prediction market are mainly manipulations that deal with
illegal money transfer and price manipulation in order to change prices in the long
term. These manipulations can be classified as an enhancement to the traditional
types of manipulation and are subsumed into trade based manipulations. Almost
all authors report their markets to be affected by manipulations which they assume
to originate from profit-oriented motivations. Solely Hansen et al. present a be-
havioural model for the occurrence of one manipulation type typical for prediction
markets. They describe the premise for a surrounding in which price manipulations
are likely to appear by introducing two static requirements. Although some articles
argue that the theoretical effects of manipulations in prediction markets are small
or even have a positive effect on efficiency, they generally find these more or less
positive effects of manipulation to be outperformed by the negative aspects. A ma-
nipulation detection and suppression is thus desirable, whereby so far no detailed
literature exists for manipulation recognition in the very field of prediction markets.
More information on the efforts in the field of manipulation detection by software
systems is given in Section 3.5. However, in this work we focus on the manipula-
tion types specific to prediction markets, namely illegal money transfer and price
manipulation. We identify incentive compatibility as the essential characteristic of
an electronic market which in the case of its absence accounts for the respective
manipulations. In addition, a novel manipulation detection technique is introduced,
that allows for an effective detection of those manipulations defined.

3. Fraud and the Breakdown of
Incentive Compatibility
This chapter gives a short introduction to incentive compatibility and its break-
down in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 then discusses the incentive systems important to
this work that participants of prediction markets are confronted with. Based on
these incentives different motives for manipulation are described in Section 3.3. In
Section 3.4 the character of anonymity within a transaction network evolved from
market transactions is described. Concluding this chapter Section 3.5 introduces cur-
rent ideas and frameworks that are dedicated to detect explicitly fraudulent actions
within such markets.
3.1 Incentive Compatibility and its Breakdown
Basis to the idea of a prediction market and its information aggregation aspect is
certainly the market mechanism that matches the expressed opinions encoded in
buy and sell orders for shares tied to certain events and which results in a certain
price taken as prediction. Underlying that functionality is the assumption of a
market that not only provides the technical ability to match orders as described,
but also incentivises its traders to systematically reveal their true opinion about
the shares. If the market provides this characteristic the prices will instantly reflect
all new available information in the price to all traders at any point in time and
such a market is thus called an efficient market [Milg 92]. The condition for this to
happen is called incentive compatibility which is reached if all participants reach their
maximum outcome in the system by truthfully revealing any private information
asked for by the market mechanism. This occurs, for example, if the market system
reaches the most efficient system status if all participants’ follow their plans of
actions (which depict all affordable actions of the participant) and this results in a
maximum personal profit (maximum profit plan). Formally, the individual trader’s
profit maximisation plans are separable and do not have external effects on other
traders’ plans. In a situation where a participant’s maximum profit plan of action
results in a system status that is less efficient than it would be without the participant
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following this plan the incentive compatibility of the market system is not given. In
a market, incentive compatibility is not available, if traders can profit from fraud or
cease to participate in the market because of fear from fraud. This is for example in a
prediction market the case if the a trader gains more profit by cheating than by acting
according to the rules. In a prediction market, failures of the incentive system and
thus incentive incompatibility can appear by several means which are introduced in
Section 3.2. As participants in a market are assumed to be profit maximising, these
changes in the incentive system are usually exploited by the participants expecting
a higher profit by doing so. These actions are usually forbidden by market rules.
They are thus irregular and called fraudulent or are referred to as manipulations.
Usually incentive compatibility is maintained by a system design that makes it more
lucrative to play by the rules. This can be achieved by the traders having systematic
higher rewards when playing conforming to the rules then when playing against them.
This can be supported by guaranteed monetary incentives or systematic penalties
(i.e. fines or system exclusion).
3.2 Incentive Systems of Prediction Markets
To induce participants within a system act conforming to the system rules, incentives
are given. The ensemble of the arrangements in that direction is called the incen-
tive system. In the following we introduce the incentive systems in the domain of
prediction markets by describing a prediction market configuration in three different
scenarios and the problems resulting from the different requirements for reaching in-
centive compatibility. The terms ’closed world’ and ’open world’ relate to the traded
events of the prediction market. Where in a closed world prediction market neither
the traders nor any other people have a personal tie to the traded events (i.e. in
a laboratory experiment) the open world prediction market explicitly assumes this
connections. Together with the personal ties, a market in an open world scenario
describes a system visible to the public and especially to the deciders of the real
world event. As introduced in Section 2.1 basic to any prediction market scenario
is the payoff that takes place after the market is closed and the real world event’s
outcome is known. For the prediction market and its outcome in precise predictions
the best traders are the ones that truthfully revealed their true opinion at any point
in time during the market. So after market close the system should honour this
truthful information revealing strategy by getting best rewards to players that did
so.
1. Real money market in a closed world scenario
This scenario describes a prediction market where trader buy and sell shares within a
market by using real world money. However, the prediction market is either isolated
from the outside world or does not influence the events in the outside world (closed
world assumption). So gains and losses are directly tied to the traders’ wealth and
if the closed world assumption holds, the traders’ wealth is only a result of their
trading behaviour. The gain Gw of traders realised from any interaction with the
outside world w, therefore, is given by Gw = 0.
Consider a trader m who has created multiple accounts A and B and who uses
transfers in order to improve the rank of account B. Does this behaviour increase
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his gain? For simplicity assume, he invests 1000 Euro per account (a total of 2000
Euro), he transfers 90% of his funds from account A to account B (fraudulent trade)
and since he is clever, he succeeds in gaining 6 cent per Euro invested by regular
trades. His gain without transfer is
GmR = GA +GB +Gw = 60 + 60 + 0 = 120 Euro,
where GmR denotes his total gain for the trader with a fraudulent behaviour which
in this scenario is equal to the behaviour of a regular trader r. GA denotes his gain
from account A, and GB his gain from account B. Next, for simplicity, we assume
he first transfers the money from A to B and then executes his regular trades with
the same cleverness as above. We clearly see, that the transfer from A to B only
affects the money distribution between the accounts but not the gain: Account A
has a balance of 100 Euro before he starts regular trading, account B has a balance
of 1900 Euro which results in the total gain GF as
GmR = 6 + 114 + 0 = 120 Euro.
So, in this setting the money transfer from A to B does not lead to an extra gain
from this type of fraudulent behaviour. However, since in a double auction market
a fraudulent trader runs a certain risk, that some of his transfers are intercepted
by other traders, there is a certain probability (5% in our example) that money
will be lost in the transfer trades (5% of 900 Euro = 45 Euro) on the balance of
the receivinig account. So in the first scenario the balance of his accounts after the
transfer will be 100 Euro on account A, 1855 Euro on account B and his gains are
GmR = 6 + (−45 + 111, 30) + 0 = 72, 3 Euro.
One immediately sees that the trader is better off without this type of fraudulent
behaviour in this setting. Even, if he succeeds in executing fraud without losses,
this does not earn him extra gains. A prediction market under the closed world
assumption is incentive compatible. A rational trader will participate voluntarily
because he expects to gain from his cleverness and he will not commit this type
of fraud. In total this results in Inequation 3.1 with the rewards of regular trading
return Return(·)RT being higher than the rewards of trading irregularly Return(·)IT.
Return(Moneyreal,Worldclosed)RT >> Return(Moneyreal,Worldclosed)IT ≈ 0 (3.1)
2. Play money market in a closed world scenario
In this scenario the real money of the preceding scenario is replaced by play money
without direct ties to the wealth of the traders. Each trader gets the play money
by the system and has no losses of real wealth even in the case of going bankrupt
in the market. In fact the only consequence of this is being not able to participate
anymore in the case of a total loss.
As the monetary incentive of enhancing the own wealth is not given in this scenario,
instead prizes are given to the best traders in the market. A trader is therefore
better than another trader, if he traded better with respect to the trading of the
other traders. In a market system where all traders get the same initial play money
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this is measured by the final depot values of the traders in the depot value ranking
with the best players on top and the worst at bottom. So the main ambition of the
traders can be described by “winning the game” by trading in a clever way to their
own profit that conforms to the operator’s goals.
But as loss and even bankruptcy does not harm the real world wealth of the par-
ticipants, any means for reaching a high depot value in the end are available. So
fraudulent actions like coalitions may appear where rings of traders agree on one
trader earning the maximum profit thus transferring their initial play money to the
agreed trader to let him have a better position in the depot value ranking. The
won price is in the end divided by the ring. Usually such behaviour is regularised or
forbidden by market rules.
If we again take GmR as the total return of the actions of trader m, his return of
the two accounts he is in control of (A and B) is not any longer dependent on
his own real wealth, thus not perceived as the sum of GA + GB as in the previous
scenario, but separately as max (GA, GB). In a play money setting this value is
again connected with a certain prize whose value stands as the real world return of
the market. The prize’s value is expressed by the prize function prize (r) for the
play money result r with respect to the depot values of the other traders and the
set of prize in connection to the depot value ranking. Taken the same numbers of
initial investments for A and B of 1000 Euro each, and a gaining of 6 cent per Euro
invested by regular trades, the gains of trader f would be
GmR = prize (max (GA, GB)) +Gw = prize (max (60, 60)) + 0 = prize (60) Euro.
Furthermore, as gains in each account can be seen separately and are not connected
to each other by the wealth of the trader controlling them, also transfers from other
sources than regular trading in the market (i.e. other accounts one is in control of)
can be seen as gains to the benefited account. Adding the money transfer then
extends the gains GmR to
GmR = prize (max ((−900 + 6) , (900 + 114))) + 0 = prize (1014) Euro.
Now adding a risk of 5% for loosing money in a transaction results in
GmR = prize (max ((−900 + 6) , (855 + 111, 30))) + 0 = prize (966, 30) Euro.
As can be seen, the risk of interception is lowering the gains, but, as also can be seen,
this behaviour is still an advantage up to the risk of a total loss in the transaction
due to an interception by other traders. The only limiting aspect is the amount of
money available to transfer from an account in control of, as such a system usually
does not allow for depot values below zero. The logical way to increase the gains
of the account in favour of the transactions is to get in control of more than one
account and arrange transfers from there.
So, in a closed world market setting with play money the system pays dividends for
irregular behaviour which makes it more profitable for the trader to act irregular and
receive the return Return(Moneyplay,Worldclosed)IT than to act by the rules with the
return Return(Moneyplay,Worldclosed)RT which results in the incentive compatibility
inequation in Inequation 3.2.
Return(Moneyplay,Worldclosed)RT << Return(Moneyplay,Worldclosed)IT (3.2)
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3. Real money market in an open world scenario
Transferring the closed world scenario with play money from above to an open world
domain maintains the ties to the real loss of the trader in case that he does not trade
compliant with the rules of the market which call for truthfully revealing the true
opinion, but transfers the whole market system into a different surrounding. Now the
traded events are tied to the real world with the traders or other people in the real
world being interested in the outcome of the event. This brings up new incentives
playing a decisive role by overlaying the market’s inherent incentive system. If for
example a trader is, by whatever means, personally tied to the outcome of the share’s
real world counterpart event i.e. he is a member of a certain party and interested in
high market prices of this party (cp. signalling in Chapter 1, he could valuate the
event coming true (victory of a certain party) higher than getting the gains or losses
in the market (monetary losses below a certain amount). We refer to the traders’
choice between the real world incentive system and the market incentive system as
the super game e.g. a trader valuates gains for the party he is member of higher than
his own profits reachable in the market. The term super game therefore addresses
the choice of the trader to ’play’ within the market’s incentive system or within the
real world’s incentive system.
In this scenario a trader p starts operating with a single account GC . Assume
that the trader has again 1000 Euro invested and the gains by accomplishing clever
regular trades on the market are 6%. As the returns of the real world Gw are not
measurable in strict numbers we set these to x Euro. The total gains GpR of trader
p are then described by
GpR = GC +Gw = 60 + x Euro.
Taken the fact that the trader’s gains from the real world are ≥ 0 only if he influences
the price, x will be zero in this case. Now as the trader tries to influence the market
price (increase the price) he buys large amounts of stock without caring for clever
trading. In fact we assume the trader to make losses of 6% which gives us the total
return as
GpR = −60 + x Euro
which is attractive to the trader if to him the price shift is worth 120 Euro (in real
world money), so x > 120, as then the total gains exceed the previous situation
where he does not influence the price.
So, the return in this scenario is not only a direct monetary one but also the one of
being able to influence the real world event and the real world deciders, respectively,
by signalling via the prices. The problem for the market operator in this scenario
is that the external gains of the players are unknown to him. Therefore, he cannot
regulate the market in such a way that incentive compatibility holds.
4. Play money market in an open world scenario
In this scenario the real money from the previous scenario is changed to play money.
As in the second scenario, the effects to the traders are that the playing money is
not directly tied to the wealth of the trader anymore. More precisely the total result
GpR for trader p with account C trying to shift the prices of a share is given as
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GpR = prize (max (GC , 0)) +Gw
which completely dissolves any boundaries by transaction costs or losses due to risk
in the transaction as GpR will always be greater-to zero if any intention for signalling
by prices is present (GpR > 0). The only limiting factors are the bankruptcy of the
account due to the fact that a play money market usually does not allow for depot
values below zero and the number of shares of the affected shares available.
To trader m trying to transfer money from one account A to another self controlled
account B the situation in this scenario is the same as in the second scenario as the
gains from the outside world Gw did not affect his strategy. Also in this scenario
this type of money transfer among a self controlled coalition is more lucrative than
trading regular with one trader.
Now the influence of the prediction market operator on both incentive systems de-
picted in Figure 3.1 is quite different. While the market incentive system in a play
money market is fully controllable by the value and amount of the prizes, the real
world incentive system can be out of reach as the possible gains of a trader outside
the prediction market system are not observable neither controllable by the market
operator. Furthermore the real world incentive system often deals with emotional
bindings, i.e. in political stock markets the party of the trader, which may address
psychological “reflexes” rather than rational behaviour.













Figure 3.1: Incentive Systems of prediction markets
Both areas of conflict (incentive incompatible situations) are depicted next to each
other in Figure 3.2. The boxes denote the incentive system where the depicted action
plans lead to different gains with each denoting incentive incompatibility.
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Incompatible Market Incentive Situation
”I want a higher rank” : Money Transfer Manipulation
Incompatible Real World Incentive Situation
”I want to send signals” : Price Manipulation






Figure 3.2: Incentive incompatible situations of prediction markets and action plans
within
As mentioned in the beginning, the incentive systems have to be designed to provide
incentive compatibility. As seen above this is by system design only given in the
first scenario of real money used in a closed world scenario. Where the open world
scenarios both offer incentive incompatibility only at the super-game level, the ap-
plication of play money scenarios result in incentive incompatibilities on both the
super-game and market incentive system level compared to Figure 3.1. In all cases
the effects of a systematic incentive incompatibility are manipulation and fraudulent
actions, as the return for these action plans are more profitable than for regular trad-
ing ones. To control the effects of this incompatibilities, usually rules that decrease
the dividends for cheating thus increasing the costs for irregular behaviour, are in-
troduced. This introduction of rules cause control costs that have to be paid by the
system administrator but cause a reduction of attempts to commit fraud in the best
case. The effect to control especially the incentive incompatibility on the level of the
super-game, enhancing the incentive system itself may help. For example, to ensure
a good quality of a play money market’s incentives the prizes to be won could be
enhanced so that the personal dividend in the market (i.e winning a prize) is higher
than the personal dividend of the real world (i.e. my party wins by more people
voting for it as the price signal of the prediction market made them to do so). But
also this can end up in manipulation as with exclusiveness or too attractive prizes
the incentive of “doing good” is enlarged to the negative “doing good by any cost or
means” to win the price which also results in traders cheating. Finally some traders
manipulate just for the incentive of having fun or as the end in itself by showing
how clever they are.
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3.3 Fraudulent Actions within Prediction Mar-
kets
To ensure a valid incentive system to all participants at any time a prediction market
system needs the abidance of certain rules by the traders. Intentional renunciation
of these rules is carried out for different motives which usually base on an incom-
patibility of incentives which makes it possible and even attractive to act fraudulent
with rational thoughts as described in Section 3.1. The consequence of this envi-
ronment is usually paired with the basic motivations that traders have. Whereas
a “good minded” trader would not even act fraudulent if he is offered explicitly to
do so, other traders may have a basic affinity to certain kinds of fraud and try to
exploit any given possibility. The main motivations in a prediction market for doing
so are described in the following sections.
3.3.1 Getting a Higher Rank
Within prediction markets egoism is the main incitement for the system to work in a
proper manner and the predictions gain accuracy with the level of acting egoistically
if incentive compatibility is given. But it is the egoism combined with playing by the
rules that supports the system. As mentioned in Sections 2.1 and 3.2 prediction mar-
kets may be carried out in a play money setting with no direct connection between
the money lost in the game and real assets of the participant. In such a system each
participant gets a certain amount of initial play money to trade with. As the nature
of electronic markets is virtual, traders especially in play money markets are usually
able to apply for multiple accounts or join single (rule conforming) identities they
are in reach of i.e. accounts from family members in terms of actions and effects. In
both cases the traders try to augment the depot value of one selected account with
the initial play money from the others. By these actions the central account the
money is transferred to increases its depot value whereas the others decrease by the
money transferred.
3.3.2 Signalling to the Outside World
As described in the motivation in Chapter 1 the second incitement for fraudulent
actions is based on the shares’ prices being regarded as the true prediction for the
outcome of the event by the deciders of the real event. Thus the manipulator at-
tempts to influence the shares’ price by systematic buys or sells of large quantities of
shares and consequently influence the decisions of traders in the real world. As with
respect to the (manipulated and overvalued) market price the real world traders as-
sume their private expectation to be undervalued, the manipulator hopes for the real
world decider to decide in favour of this shares’ outcome and thus a feedback effect
of the affected market price. In contrast to a trader abiding to the market incentive
system, for the trader trying to send signals in the super-game the incentives of the
prediction market system are not relevant anymore. Even more they are completely
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replaced by the incentive of the real world i.e. the trader values the revenue of his
contribution to the signal of the (over- or undervalued) prices onto the real world
deciders (assumed higher votes in the real world) higher than the personal revenue
to be reached within the market (winning a price in a play money setting or the
money gain in a real money setting).
3.3.3 Consequences
The consequences of fraud are on the one side irregular price fluctuations which
affect the prediction of the market. On the other side manipulations especially of
the motivation of getting a better rank lead to increases of the depot value of the
manipulator because of the manipulations. This usually leads to an increase of his
ranking within the depot value ranking which could strike the incentive system of the
market by non-manipulating traders supposing to be unsuccessful as their place in
the ranking decreases. The options for dealing with detected fraud which are usually
undertaken by the market administration are spelled out in the market regulations.
Manipulating traders can be expelled from the market directly or disallowed to win
a price depending on the market system. Despite the deactivation of manipulative
traders the effects of the manipulation are still present in the market. As discussed in
Section 2.3 prices will recover to the true rate but letting the manipulating traders
stay in the market will surely end up in more dissatisfaction of other traders or
market operators as the manipulating traders still show up in the top places of
the depot value ranking. Empirical results in markets conducted at the Institute
for Information Systems and Management in Karlsruhe show that the publication
of traders supposed to be manipulating can normalise the negative effects of non-
manipulating traders: In several markets the depot values of traders supposed to be
manipulating were marked as being manipulated. In the effect the non-manipulating
traders perceived the market as being fair again. However Section 2.3 also claims
more precision for the market in the latter case by stronger arbitrage effects and
higher activity of regular traders.
3.4 Anonymity in Trading Networks
Within an electronic market the traders interact with the market system. The mar-
ket system manages the buy and sell orders and presents these to the traders usually
as order books. In Figure 3.3 this market activity is depicted by traders who give
their orders to the market system which matches the orders by a defined algorithm
(auction mechanism). The orders are given by the traders in the following chrono-
logical sequence:
• Trader A: Buy 2 shares of Share1 for a maximum of 6 monetary units
• Trader B: Sell 4 shares of Share3 for a minimum of 5 monetary units
• Trader C: Sell 10 shares ofShare1 for a minimum of 5 monetary units
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• Trader C: Buy 2 shares of Share3 for a maximum of 6 monetary units
• Trader D: Buy 10 shares of Share1 for a maximum of 5 monetary units.
In the order book only a certain number of sell and buy orders are displayed as can be
seen in Figure 3.4. The number of orders shown is called the depth of the order book.
With the displayed orders there is no information given about the identity of the
selling or buying trader connected with the order. So the interactions of the traders
are towards the market system rather than towards any other traders. With regard
to the objective of a research based on the analysis of such a network this argument
is essential especially where behavioural aspects like intended or unintended acts
of traders towards other traders are relevant. In the case of certain manipulation
patterns this is the case as for example traders trying to bypass this anonymity in





Buy 2 Share1 for 6 MU max
Market
System
Sell 4 Share3 for 5 MU min
Sell 10 Share1 for 5 MU min
Buy 2 Share3 for 6 MU max










4 @ 5 MU 2 @ 6 MU
Figure 3.3: Trading towards the market system with MU as monetary units
So compared to a traditional market, where the traders deal with each other, a
stock market and in particular an electronic market is based on the assumption
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that, depending on the market mechanism, the traders act anonymously. As the
traders interact with the market system rather than with each other, the matching
process depends only on the order parameters share, entry time of order, amount
and due-date and not on the personal likes or dislikes of the traders regarding their
counterpart in a transaction. So for building up transaction networks this context
has to be kept in mind, especially when modelling networks that are going to be
analysed in a social network context (i.e. seen as social networks [Fran 07]). This
fact is utilised in analysing the traders’ actions from a social network analysis point
of view along with a method borrowed from this research area.
3.5 Fraud Detection Systems
To generate a smooth operation of the market, market operators try to enforce the
market rules by using mechanisms to detect and subsequently prosecute irregulari-
ties. Given the sizes and propagation of electronic systems nowadays, building up
efficient technical systems to detect and avoid irregularities becomes more important.
The main area where fraud detecting systems are operated is in economic systems
where fraud may result in severe consequences like monetary losses. Thus for eco-
nomic systems within the domain of the internet the United States Department of
Justice [Just 08] differenciate between the following fraud schemes:
• Auction and Retail Schemes Online with the most frequently reported form of
internet fraud. Typically sellers pretend a good to be of a high value. After the
payment is carried out, the delivered item is of a lower value than advertised
(if sent anyway).
• Business Opportunity/“Work-at-Home” Schemes Online where customers are
offered well paid job opportunities. For a certain fee the material is supposed
to be delivered which after payment usually does not happen.
• Identity Theft and Fraud as the wrongful obtaining and using of someone
else’s personal data in some way that involves fraud or deception, typically for
economic gain.
• Investment Schemes Online which consist of Market Manipulation Schemes
and Other Investment Schemes with the first scheme describing the realisation
of substantial profits by e.g. disseminating false and fraudulent information in
an effort to cause illegal price shifts and buying and selling stocks before and
after the action. The second scheme describes the combination of uses of the
internet with traditional mass-marketing technology such as telemarketing to
reach large numbers of potential victims.
• Credit-Card Schemes that describe credit card numbers theft and online usage.
• Other Schemes pool mainly false, misleading or legally inaccurate information
propagation with the aim of people sending money to receive for certain service
offers like cheap divorces which are not fulfilled in the end.
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The fraudulent actions within this work emanate from prediction markets which are
part of the virtual electronic markets domain. In the previous listing this is char-
acterised by the mentioned Investment Schemes Online and especially the Market
Manipulation Schemes in which several methods and techniques for fraud detection
are used. But the use of enterprise internal systems is difficult to support by litera-
ture. Due to the protection of companies’ interests and, therefore, missing data the
existence of so called Anti Fraud Systems (AFS) or Fraud Detection System (FDS)
within companies can only be guessed. However, references concerning this issue
can be extracted from secondary reports as [Wire 00] where the results of effective
FDS are reported, the information on promoted projects within research faculties
or published number of companies, which work within this range. Approaches for
the detection of fraud within the discussed domain emanate from different scientific
areas. Basically all approaches try to determine deviations from regular behaviour
with different solutions evaluating system data transformed to networks.
In a network analysis approach Bezerra and Wainer [Beze 08] examine the anomalies
in transaction networks algorithmically in a graph built from event and task log file
data automatically generated by a system. In a first step they derive the regular
processing concept for the given data by mining regular patterns and interpret it
as background emission. This is done by including every new input data into a
graph and calculating an ’inclusion trace’ by a certain proprietary metric based on
a ’process mining’ algorithm. The difference of a new trace to the existing ones is
measured as ’inclusion costs’ for the vertex. Comparing these costs, deviations and
irregularities are detected by means of algorithmic comparison.
By means of visual network analysis Kobayashi and Ito [Koba 07] try to determine
manipulations and to predict the future market process. They represent the actions
of a participant in a market system graphically and guess the future actions based
on so called explanation functions which provide some insight into the network and
its configuration.
On the basis of Markov random fields Pandit et al. [Pand 07] present the fraud
detection system NetProbe, which assists in determining abuse in an auction network
by analysing the reputation system of the network. The reputation system queries
the opinions of the counterpart of each transaction about each other which NetProbe
utilises to build a network of the participants with honest and fraudulent links. By
the use of a belief propagation method they model probabilities for a participant to
be fraudulent and assign a status which is either fraud, accomplice or honest. The
technology of NetProbe can be used with large networks and is exemplarily applied
to a network with over 66,000 users and about 800,000 transactions.
With the purely graph based software package ADAGE McGlohon and Faloutsos
[McGl 07] follow a direction similar to Kobayashi and Ito [Koba 07] where the net-
work is represented in a visual context, whereby the focus here strongly lies on the
temporal development of the network.
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For the detection of manipulative actions within prediction markets the software
“PSM” which in Section 7.2 of Chapter 7 is used to derive the real world market
data offers a mechanism of cascaded structured queries to the transaction database
which accomplishes a structured comparison of the extracted counterparts of each
transaction finding overlaying transaction partners which correspond to certain ma-
nipulation behaviours.
Finally, all presented approaches examine the networks with the idea of finding
out about certain developments which cannot be seen as rule conforming, thus as
abnormal. Once determined, developments exceed a certain threshold value and are
thereby classified. More general approaches like [Blum 06] consider rather the meta
aspect, correlating several parameters of the system and thus try to take the context
of the underlying system more into account. Here the results of different approaches
(e.g. the ones specified above) are computed for the system separately. With the
idea that certain combinations of results indicate a participant to be fraudulent to
a certain probability the results are aggregated and a status of being fraudulent or
not based on this probability is assigned to each participant.
The fraud detection approach presented in this thesis is applied to transaction data
of prediction markets. As introduced in the objectives in Section 1.1 the presented
eigensystem approach is adapted from the field of social network analysis which in
the eigensystem methods focuses on the analysis of recursive relations among partic-
ipants within a network. In the area of market manipulation detection approaches
this enhances the analyses means with a new approach.
30 3. Fraud and the Breakdown of Incentive Compatibility
Figure 3.4: Trading screen of the prediction market system STOCCER with order
books
4. Social Network Analysis
In principle social network analysis regards actions among participants in a network
as dependent from each other. As this paradigm is not applicable for a basic rule-
conforming prediction market it gains significance in the analysis of networks in
which participants reckon the network as a social network and express that by their
actions (trades). For electronic prediction markets this may be assumed for the case
of certain manipulations detectable within the transaction records of the market, for
instance in traders breaking the inherent market anonymity that will be described
in Section 3.4 by trying to transfer money among two trading accounts they own
themselves. Thus we focus on approaching the issue of detecting irregularities by
means of social network analysis where these market irregularities are recognised as
structure within a social network.
Social networks are usually formulated as participants in a network with possible
connections among each other which depict the characteristic of the network. In
the beginning of analyses on networks in the middle of the 20th century graphs and
matrices were developed as formal ways to illustrate the networks. These still form
the basis for the current techniques of visualisation and analysis within network
analysis
4.1 Social Networks as Matrices
After Moreno startet to formalise relations between participants in a network [More 36],
Forsythe and Katz [Fors 46] had the idea to illustrate social networks by means of a
matrix A. A network of n participants is thereby represented by an n × n matrix.
One row and one column is assigned to each participant with the matrix element aij
depicting the edge weight of participant i to any other participant j in the network
and aji depicting the edge weights of any other participants j in the network to i
(see Table 4.1).
32 4. Social Network Analysis
If the entries of the adjacency matrix are not binary, the underlying graph is called
a weighted graph. In this case also the adjacency matrix may be called a weighted
adjacency matrix [Dies 00]. If for any two participants within a network the edges
to each other are of the same weight (aij = aji ∀ i, j), the matrix can be called a
symmetric adjacency matrix [Meye 00, P. 85]. As an example the matrix in Table 4.1
depicts a non-symmetric weighted adjacency matrix.
Participant 1 2 3 4 5
1 0 1 2 2 1
2 2 0 2 0 0
3 3 2 0 0 0
4 1 0 0 0 0
5 1 0 0 0 0
Table 4.1: Representation of a network as weighted non-symmetric adjacency matrix
4.2 Social Networks as Graphs
In his publications Lewin [Lewi 35, Lewi 36, Lewi 38] presented geometric interpre-
tations and metrics for social networks by painting the graph structure with nodes
and vertices. Bavelas [Bave 48, Bave 50] enhanced these ideas and published con-
crete ideas on formulating a network as a graph. The ith and jth participants are
denoted as vertices vi and vj and the communication among participants vi and vj
as edges eij of the graph. If the edges are weighted (e.g. with strength wij denoting
the edge weight between vertices vi and vj) the graph is called a weighted graph,
else an unweighted. In case of pure binary bindings (i.e. a connection between vi and
vj exists or not) the edge weights wij are binary. At the same time the direction of
an edge between two vertices can be expressed by an arrow. Such a graph is called
directed, graphs without directions in edges as undirected. If in a graph vertices have
no connection to any other vertices within the network they are called isolates, the
graph is not connected.
So following [Jung 94] a weighted directed graph is denoted by
G = {V,E, ω} (4.1)
with V as the set of vertices, E with e ⊆ E2 as the set of edges and ω as a weighting
function E 7→ N. A tuple (vi, vj) ∈ V denotes an edge with ω(vi, vj) = wij describing
the weight of the edge between vertices vi and vj.
A graph where the vertices can be split up into two disjunct subsets without any
edges among the vertices of the same subset is called bipartite.
In Figure 4.1 a simple directed and weighted graph is given representing the weighted
adjacency matrix A from Table 4.1 which can be calculated by
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A =
{















Figure 4.1: Directed weighted graph illustrating the weighted adjacency matrix from
Table 4.1
4.3 Network Flows
Following Jungnickel in [Jung 94] within the graph G
δdeg(v) (4.2)
with v ∈ V denotes the degree of a vertex (number of edges incident to the vertex)




The weight of an edge from vertex vi to vertex vj is expressed by
ω(vi, vj) = wij (4.5)
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the inbound vertex flow of vertex vj.
From social network analysis we get the term ego network that describes the view on
a focal vertex (“ego”) and the vertices to whom ego is directly connected (“alters”)
plus the ties, if any, among the alters [Hann 05].
4.4 Social Network Analysis Methods
Within the research area of social network analysis vertices and edges between the
vertices are the elemenary properties which are described in network structures.
To analyse these as social networks, several methods were presented with different
focuses in the analyses’ results [Wass 99]. Some approaches try to detect cliques by
clusters of individuals who are tightly connected to one another while others look
for structural equivalence in sets of individuals by detecting similar relation patterns
of individuals with respect to the rest of the network. For our purpose of analysing
network structure evolved from stock markets we use a method which emphasises the
character of detecting subgroup formation with regard to the manipulation patterns
and the formation of traders involved in manipulation. In network analysis this
is the main focus of a third group of methods that “don’t ’look for’ anything in
particular - instead, they construct a continuous multidimensional representation of
the network in which the coordinates of the individuals can be further analysed to
obtain a variety of kinds of information about them and their relation to the rest of
the network” [Rich 00], namely methods based on spectral decomposition.
The idea to analyse a graph’s structure by means of spectral decomposition and
the analysis of the graph’s eigensystem reaches back to the 1950s. In 1953 Katz
introduced a status index for a network participant which expressed its popularity
within the network based on the status of all other participants of the network by
using a recursive algorithm similar to the calculation of an eigensystem [Katz 53].
In the research area of network analysis measures this led to a set of centrality
measures which understand the state of a network vertex as depending on other
vertices [Wass 99].
Basically within the eigensystem based status measures the status index si of a
vertex i is assumed to be dependent on the status indices of all other vertices within
the network (popularity) [Bona 72, Cvet 97]. Assuming W as a symmetric adjacency




wijsj mit j ∈ {1, . . . , n} (4.8)
which in matrix notation is
s = Ws (4.9)
or
(W − I)s = 0, (4.10)
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respectively. Applying a multiplier λ to the left hand side which does “not violate
the spirit of the model” [Bona 72] we get
λsi = (wi1s1 + wi2s2 + · · ·+ winsn) (4.11)
which again in matrix notation is
λs = W s (4.12)
or
(W − λI)s = 0, (4.13)
respectively. At the same time equation 4.13 denotes the eigenvalue equation with
λ as eigenvalue and s the corresponding eigenvector [Bona 72].
In terms of traditional eigensystem analysis the original network and hence the con-
nections between the vertices are seen as coordinates within a continuous multivari-
ate space which a eigensystem analysis is conducted on. Thereby the variable space
is rotated in order to maximise the variability of the first dimension while minimising
the variance around the current variable by letting the variable axis “perpendicular
to the first, point in the direction of the greatest remaining variability, and so on.
This set of axes is a coordinate system that can be used to describe the relative
positions of the set of points in the data. Most of the variability in the locations of
points will be accounted for by the first few dimensions of this coordinate system.
The coordinates of the points along each axis will be an eigenvector, and the length
of the projection will be an eigenvalue.” [Rich 00, Hill 07].
Within network analysis several methods utilising this basic decomposition were pub-
lished like Correspondence Analysis, NEGOPY, CONCOR, CONVAR and Bonacich
centrality with different approaches in the processing of the input network, and thus
different interpretations of the results but all methods base on eigensystem calcula-
tion and analysis (for details see [Rich 00]).
4.5 Related Areas
Within this section several analysis techniques are introduced which are used in the
field of finding structure within data by means of eigensystem analysis and aspects
that are related to the eigensystem method used in the analysis in Chapter 6 and
introduced in Section 5.1. Supporting the interpretation of the analysis’ results
in Chapter 6, Section 4.5.1 introduces the concept of principal components as an
analysis technique closely related to the eigensystem analysis used here followed by
a short introduction of the concept of Fourier decomposition in Section 4.5.2 as in
the analysis stage denoted by Equation 5.14 in Section 5.1 a Fourier sum is depicted
and interpreted.
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4.5.1 Principal Components Analysis
Using eigensystem analysis as a tool to detect structure within a multidimensional
sample of data without information on the dependencies in the sample, principal
components analysis as a method of multivariate statistics tries to reduce the num-
ber of dimensions within the dataset. As explained in Section 4.4 structure within
the dataset is detected by approximation of the relationships between the variables
in linear combinations. This results in a set of principal components of which the
relevant factors are being chosen. This choice is supported by using criteria like the
algorithmical Kaiser measure where the optimal components are chosen by the rele-
vance to the total variance of all factors. Thereby a percentage of covered variance
decides about the relevant factors. If the sum of the most relevant factors’ variance
relative to the total variance exceeds this percentage, the optimal factors are found
[Kais 60]. Another measure is depicted by the visual scree test which also utilises
the covered variances of the single factors. Instead of a fixed share of the total vari-
ance the scree test detects the differences between the variances of the most relevant
factors. If the difference in the two most relevant factors next to each other exceeds
a certain limit, the optimal number of relevant factors is found [Catt 66]. Several
other measures are described in [Tuck 69]. In principal components analysis the
information content is measured by the explained variance in each dimension with
the explained variance decreasing with any new dimension. So principal components
analysis uses all variability within the dataset in the analysis.
4.5.2 Fourier Decomposition
In 1822 the book“Theórie analytique de la chaleur” (The Analytical Theory of Heat)
by Jean Baptiste Fourier was published [Four 84]. In the context of heat distribution
he introduced a univariate decomposition technique in which a discrete function
over time could be approximated by the trigonometric series of a sum of unlimited
sinusodial functions [Four 84]. As in the following Chapter 6 in Section 5.1 a network
will be described by a Fourier sum in Equation 5.14, the original interpretation within
the context of the decomposition of a univariate signal is given in the following.
Given information encoded in a continuous signal Fourier decomposition is used to
transform this signal into a sum of discrete functions of sinus waves thus splitting
the information into ordered subparts denoting the importance of each component
to the main signal. More formally the arbitrary periodic function f(x) with the
wave count k can be described as a sum of sinusoidal and cosinusoidal oscillations,
so harmonic functions f(x) in Equation 4.14 with the Fourier coefficients ak and bk







(ak cos(kx) + bk sin(kx)) (4.14)














f(x) cos(kx) dx, k ≥ 1 (4.16)
The summands of Equation 4.14 represent the partial signal adding up to more detail
with k →∞. Figure 4.2 shows four signals (black line) with the first four summands
for each approximation (red, yellow, green, blue lines).
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Figure 4.2: Fourier approximations of four signals
5. Eigensystems in Hilbert Space
This chapter describes the formal analysis method following up the social network
analysis ideas of centrality measures based on eigensystem analyses in Section 4.4.
Section 5.1 and 5.2 introduce the analysis method and the formulation of transaction
networks as adequate input to the specific technique. Section 5.3 shows the encoding,
eigensystem calculation and interpretation of certain graph patterns. The presented
analysis accounts especially for the directional aspects of the analysed transaction
networks. Thus an eigensystem analysis technique is utilised which is capable of
analysing directed, weighted networks by transforming the network into a complex
form obtaining a Hermitian matrix and thus operating in Hilbert space with the
mathematical characteristics described in the following.
5.1 Hermitian Matrices
A complex number z can be represented in algebraic form or equivalently in expo-
nential form as z = a+ib = |z|eiφ with the real part of z being denoted as Re(z) = a,
the imaginary part as Im(z) = b, the absolute value as |z| =
√
a2 + b2, and the phase
as 0 ≤ φ = arccos Re(z)|z| ≤ π, with i the imaginary unit (i
2 = −1). z = a− ib denotes
the complex conjugate of z. The angle or phase of a complex number z is denoted
by ϕ (z) and the absolute shift between two complex numbers z1 and z2 by ϕ (z1, z2).
The outer product of two column vectors x and y with dimensions n× 1 is defined
as
xy∗ =
 x1y1 . . . x1yn. . . . . . . . .
xny1 . . . xnyn
 (5.1)
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with y∗ representing the conjugate complex transpose of y. The inner product of
x,y ∈ Cn is defined as




The norm will be denoted ‖ x ‖ and defined as
‖ x ‖=
√
〈x | x〉. (5.3)
A matrix H is called Hermitian, if and only if
H∗ = H (5.4)
This means that the matrix entries can be written as hlk = hkl. Hermitian matrices
are also normal
HH∗ = H∗H. (5.5)
Calculating the eigensystem of matrix H we get the set of real valued eigenvalues Λ








If, in addition, hkk = 0 ∀ k




thus the eigenvalues split up into the spectrum σ (H) of H as a set of positive, zero
and negative eigenvalues
σ (H) = Λ = Λ+ ∪ Λ0 ∪ Λ− = {λ1, λ2, . . . , λn} ∈ R (5.8)
and their corresponding set of orthogonal eigenvectors
X = X+ ∪X0 ∪X− = {x1,x2, . . . ,xn} with xi ∈ C. (5.9)
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with X+ denoting the eigenvectors corresponding to positive eigenvalues, X− the
eigenvectors corresponding to negative eigenvalues and X0 the eigenvectors corre-
sponding to zero eigenvalues.
An eigenvalue λi and its corresponding eigenvector xi are referred to as “eigenpair”.
The spectral radius of H is defined as
||H|| = max (|Λ|) , (5.10)






The eigenvectors of a Hermitian matrix H form a complete orthogonal system and
can thus be transformed to an orthogonal basis. Since all eigenvalues of a Hermitian
matrix are real the interpretation of the eigenvalues in the context of social network
analysis does not pose any difficulty. In mathematical literature the eigenvalues are
usually sorted by their value
λ1 ≥ . . . 0 ≥ . . . ≥ λn. (5.12)
However, if not stated otherwise within this work we assume the eigenvalues to be
sorted by their absolute values
|λ1| ≥ . . . ≥ |λn| (5.13)
to help identifying the dominant substructures for interpretation.









xi1xi1 · · · xi1xin... . . . ...
xinxi1 · · · xinxin
 (5.15)
denoting the orthogonal projector Pi of the eigenvector xi corresponding to eigen-
value λi. Further
P 2k = Pk = P
∗
k (5.16)




Pk = I. (5.17)





defines the total variation σ2 contained in H.
The cumulated covered variance of the kth subspace corresponding to the eigenvalues










with the eigenvalues sorted as noted in 5.13.
In the sense of centrality measures described in Section 4.4 the measures based on
eigensystem analysis depict the most central vertex k in a graph by the largest
absolute eigenvector component xik = maxj |xij| of the eigenvector xi corresponding
to the largest absolute eigenvalue λmax = maxl |λl|. This also holds for the most
central vertices in each substructure identified by the eigenvectors.
Invariant Properties
The measures used for describing the graphs’ structures within the eigensystem
are relations among the elements of the eigensystem namely distances between the
subspaces denoted by the eigenvectors and their components. Thereby the properties
of the complex numbers of the eigenvector components like absolute values and phase
information describe structural properties of the original graph like direction of flows
within a certain structure. Because of
〈eiφkxk | eiφlxl〉 = e−iφkeiφl〈xk | xl〉 = ei(φk−φl)〈xk | xl〉 = ei(φk−φl)δkl (5.20)
the eigenvectors are invariant to arbitrary rotation. Within this work we assume the
eigenvectors xi and thus their complex eigenvector components xij being rotated
such that the phase of the eigenvector component corresponding to the maximum
eigenvalue λmax (cp. anchor (xi) in Equation 5.30) has a phase of 0.
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Metrics in Hilbert Space
Furthermore we work in Hilbert space which is a complete normed inner product
space, the norm is defined by the scalar product ‖x‖2 = 〈x|x〉 (see Equation 5.3).
If vector cy and cz are normed to 1
‖cy‖ = ‖cz‖ = 1 (5.21)
we can calculate the distances of a vector cy from a vector cz by
‖cy − cz‖2 = 〈cy − cz|cy − cz〉
= 〈cy|cy〉+ 〈cz|cz〉 − 〈cy|cz〉 − 〈cz|cy〉
= ‖cy‖2 + ‖cz‖2 − 〈cy|cz〉 − 〈cy|cz〉
= ‖cy‖2 + ‖cz‖2 − 2Re(〈cy|cz〉)
= 2− 2Re(〈cy|cz〉). (5.22)
We identify the vector cy with minimal distance to vector cz by
min
y
(2− 2Re(〈cy|cz〉)) . (5.23)
Thereby the distance between cy and cz becomes minimal if the real part of a scalar
product becomes minimal if
max
y
Re (〈cy|cz〉) ≤ 1. (5.24)
This will be referred to in the spectral clustering method in Section 5.3.3.
5.2 Networks as Hermitian Matrices
Following Hoser and Geyer-Schulz [Hose 05] we take a network as a directed graph
(digraph) in the representation of a real valued adjacency matrix A which is trans-
formed into the Hermitian matrix H by first constructing the complex valued adja-
cency matrix
AC = A+ i · At. (5.25)
Thereby the real part of a matrix entry ajk can be seen as the outbound flow of
vertex vj to vertex vk (ω(vj, vk)) and the imaginary part as the inbound flow of
vertex vj from vertex vk (ω(vk, vj)).
AC then is rotated to obtain the Hermitian adjacency matrix H as
H = AC · e−i
π
4 . (5.26)
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By transforming a graph’s adjacency matrix into the complex Hermitian form de-
scribed above and calculating the eigensystem of this matrix, all information of the
graph structure and directional characteristic is retained within the eigensystem.
5.3 Analysis of the Eigensystem
Having introduced the analysis technique the calculated eigensystem of a graph
without self incident vertices (hkk = 0 ∀ k) consists of the non-zero eigenvalues
Λ = {Λ+,Λ−} ∈ R and the eigenvectors X = {X+,X−} ∈ C (cp. Section 5.1)
with certain structural characteristics. As introduced in Section 4.4 the eigensystem
calculation of transaction networks describes the positions of the vertices towards
each other in terms of centrality within the network which is used for the semantic
interpretation of importance within the group. The following sections present the
analysis of the eigensystem as a result of the preceeding calculations in terms of
describing and finding the transaction patterns proposed in Section 6.2.
5.3.1 Visualisation of the Eigensystem
Complex numbers can be colour coded following the colour scheme given in Figure 5.1
which is derived from the colour circle. Thereby the absolute value |xj| of each
component corresponds to the saturation of colour, while the phase φ(xj) of the
complex value encodes the colour itself. Thus a component with a low absolute
value will be represented as a light saturated colour or even gray, while a component
with a high absolute value will show a more or less saturated colour according to its
phase. For example the value x12 = 0.9e
iπ
4 will show an intensely saturated yellow,
the value x822 = 0.2e











Figure 5.1: Colour coding of complex numbers
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The visualisation of a graph with the weighted 4 × 4 adjacency matrix A1
A1 =

0 6 2 3
6 0 3 6
2 5 0 10
3 5 2 0
 (5.27)
and the eigensystem shown in Table 5.1 is given in Figure 5.2 where the eigenvectors
xi are the rows of a graphical array (x1, . . . ,xn)
T . The eigenvectors are sorted by the
absolute value of each eigenvector’s corresponding eigenvalue in descending order.
For the sake of clarity of the phase information the saturation is not applied in
the visualisations throughout this work. A detailed description of this visualisation
technique is given in [Hose 07c].
λk 19.85 -10.76 -9.17 0.084
| z | φ(z) | z | φ(z) | z | φ(z) | z | φ(z)
xk
0.41 -0.16 0.09 -0.15 0.60 -0.48 0.68 0
0.54 -0.78 0.31 -2.97 0.71 2.40 0.33 0
0.49 -3.07 0.59 0 0.35 2.55 0.54 -0.50
0.55 0 0.74 -0.05 0.07 2.57 0.38 -2.71
Table 5.1: Eigensystem for A1 (Equation 5.27) described in Table 5.1 with z = |z|eiφ








Figure 5.2: Visualisation of the eigensystem in Table 5.1
5.3.2 Structures represented by the Eigensystem
The structure of a network can be measured and described at several levels and by
several means. Up to now network structures in terms of patterns were described
by means of figurative language in Section 3.3 or graph theory in Section 6.2. After
having processed transaction data from a network the proposed method results in
the mentioned eigensystem. Now the input variables in form of networks hold all
information on the network which is sustained within the eigensystem calculation. So
the information is still contained in the resulting eigensystem but in a disaggregated
46 5. Eigensystems in Hilbert Space
way. To approach these results and what can be seen within the eigensystem we
take a close look at the most extremal network structures in the sense of a trading
network namely a strongly connected or complete structure and a star-like structure,
respectively. In terms of graph structures the term size of the structure describes
the number of vertices that are to be assigned to the structure and the term strength
of the structure usually describes the amount of transactions within the structure,
how visible the structure is in relation to the rest of the network.
In general the spectrum consists of the eigenvalues Λ representing the weighting fac-
tors of the subspaces given by the eigenvectors X. Each of the eigenvalues describes
a slice of the total variance within the data with the largest absolute values sum-
ming up to y % describing y % of the total structure of the network. If this main
structures are covered by only a few eigenvalues, than the main structures can be
extracted by analysing these eigenvalues and their corresponding eigenvectors.
To each of the eigenvalues λi one subspace is corresponding which is built up by the
eigenvector xi. The structure of the eigenvector components i.e. the relations of the
components to each other gives information on the structure within that subspace.
The position j of the eigenvector component xj within the eigenvector x indicates














































Figure 5.3: Complete and star graph structure
In Figure 5.3 the two most extremal types of graph structures for the research
question at hand, a fully connected or complete structure and a star-like structure,
respectively, are shown. From the eigensystem calculation for both graphs the eigen-
system with eigenvalues Λ and eigenvectors X are obtained. In the following the
arrangements of the eigenvalues and eigenvectors in case of these extremal structures
is described.
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Complete Structure
A complete network structure is depicted by a vertex set in which all vertices have
connections to all other vertices with balanced connection weights. Traders in a
network act anonymously towards the market system and therefore the orders are
matched in a balanced way as described in Section 3.4. We assume that for a pre-
diction market with rational traders and without manipulative actions the vertices
within the different network types described in Section 6.1 tend to form complete
structures. In terms of economic networks with the vertices as economic entities like
companies this network structure would describe a market in perfect competition.
The eigensystem
In terms of acoustic signals a complete graph would be described as “ground noise”.
That is because no specific pattern is emerging from the network formation but the
arrangement of the vertices and flows is almost totally balanced. The traders in the
respect of not contributing a certain structure to the network structure are referred
to as “noise traders”. If the network consists of complete and uniformly distributed
ties among the vertices as shown in the adjacency matrix in Table 5.28 and depicted
in Figure 5.4 this structure is expressed by a maximum number of minimal valued
negative eigenvalues, limited by Equation 5.6 with one eigenvalue being positive
compensating for the low valued eigenvalues.
A2 =

0 30 30 30 30
30 0 30 30 30
30 30 0 30 30
30 30 30 0 30





























Figure 5.4: Analysed complete graph
structure








Figure 5.5: Cumulated variance of the
analysed complete graph structure of
Figure 5.4
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The cumulated variance of the data depicted in Figure 5.5 is covered almost com-
pletely by the first subspace denoted by the maximum absolute eigenvalue. As the
underlying graph depicts no structure in particular the corresponding eigenvector’s
structure reflects this situation in holding information of the completeness of the
graph in the components. Following Section 5.3.1 the visualisation of the eigen-
system is given in Figure 5.6. The eigenvectors are depicted by the rows with the
eigenvector components (EVC) in columns. The right edge of the figure denotes the
sign (sgn) of the eigenvalue corresponding to each of the eigenvectors. The figure
shows the explained structure of the complete graph in the first eigenvector cor-
responding to a positive eigenvalue without any other eigenvector with alternated
algebraic sign corresponding to the first one in regard to the phase of an eigenvector
component.
λk 169.71 -42.43 -42.43 -42.43 -42.43
| z | φ(z) | z | φ(z) | z | φ(z) | z | φ(z) φ(z) | z |
xk
0.45 0 0.08 0 0.03 0 0.25 0 0.89 0
0.45 0 0.39 0 0.15 0 0.77 3.14 0.22 3.14
0.45 3,14 0.56 3.14 0.22 3.14 0.34 3.14 0.22 0
0.45 0 0.51 0 0.45 3.14 0.34 3.14 0.22 3.14
0.45 0 0.51 3.14 0.85 3.14 0.34 3.14 0.22 3.14
Table 5.2: Eigensystem for A2 described in Table 5.28 with z = |z|eiφ









Figure 5.6: Visualisation of the eigensystem in Table 5.2
Structure of a Star Graph
Having structure in the network, the eigenvalues as weighting factors of the subspaces
start to vary in their values up to the most centralised structure where all vertices are
connected to only one central vertex. Modelling the economic network structure of a
pure monopoly results in the most central structure with no connections among the
vertices connected to the monopolist which depicts the centre of the network. This
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structure in terms of graph structures is described as star-like structure or simply
as a star graph.
The eigensystem







As the non-zero eigenvalues are the positive and negative square roots of the singu-
lar values of the matrix B the spectrum of a pure (undisturbed) star graph shows
a symmetry along the x-axis when the eigenvalues are sorted by value. As a conse-
quence the eigenvectors corresponding to the two eigenvalues with the same absolute
value but opposite sign show the following characteristics: The absolute values for
each component are the same in both eigenvectors but the phase shift between the
eigenvectors’ components depend on the position of the vertex in the graph. If the
eigenvectors are rotated as described in Section 5.1 the eigenvector components are
equal in phase if the corresponding vertex is the centre of the star structure. They
have a phase shift of π if the corresponding vertices are alters [Meye 00].
The kth vertex in the original graph (which by convention holds the kth row and
column within the adjacency matrix) is represented by the kth component of each
eigenvector denoting the subspaces. The kth vertex in the original graph can be
seen as the most relevant within a substructure i if the absolute value of the kth
component of the ith eigenvector is maximal for all components of this eigenvector
anchor(xi) = Abs(xik) = maxjAbs(xij). (5.30)
In the case of Equation 5.30 k is called the anchor of the ith eigenvector xi.
If there exists another eigenvector l with the anchor on the same eigenvector com-
ponent position which additionally has no phase shift in the argument to the phase
of the anchor of the ith eigenvector
ϕ(xik, xlk) ≈ 0 with anchor(xl) = Abs(xlk) = maxjAbs(xlj) (5.31)
a star-like or central structure is present. All other components of the lth subspace
that are connected to the anchor and thus to this structure have a phase shift of
approximately π
ϕ (xmk,xik) ≈ π,m 6= i. (5.32)
The extent to which the Equations 5.31 and 5.32 approach equality shows the ex-
tent of the ’purity’ of the structure which can be expressed in certain thresholds
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for each approximation. ϕ (xmk,xik) additionally holds information about the en-
coded network flow of the pattern. Applying the inverse rotation to the obtaining
of the Hermitian adjacency matrix in Equation 5.26 gives hints on the network flow
within the found structure which can be described as ’towards’ the centre vertex
(inbound) for |ϕ (xmk,xik)− π| < 0 and ’from’ the centre vertex (outbound) for
|ϕ (xmk,xik)− π| > 0.
A3 =

0 30 30 30 30
30 0 0 0 0
30 0 0 0 0
30 0 0 0 0



















Figure 5.7: Analysed equally weighted
star graph structure








Figure 5.8: Cumulated variance of the
analysed star graph structure of Fig-
ure 5.7
In the weighted adjacency matrix in Table 5.33 which is depicted by Figure 5.7 a
star graph structure is given with its eigensystem in Table 5.3 and the visualisation
of the eigenvectors following the descriptions in Section 5.3.1. It can be clearly
seen that the structure is ’pure’ which results in a phase shift of π from the first to
the second eigenvector in the most central vertex 1 denoted by the first eigenvector
component. The other vertices i belonging to the structure have a phase shift of
zero in their corresponding eigenvector component xi. The cumulated variance of the
eigenspectrum given in Figure 5.8 clearly shows the two corresponding eigenvalues
which have alternating algebraic signs in their eigenvalues. The visualisation of the
eigensystem in Figure 5.9 with the same formal arrangements as Figure 5.6 shows a
clear phase shift of π of all eigenvector components of the corresponding eigenvectors.
The second eigenvector component in contrast has a phase shift of zero (red box in
both rows) which indicates the centre of the star graph. The third to fifth row are
blank as the eigenvalues are zero.
5.3.3 Clustering with the Eigensystem
The results of the analysis can be analysed by utilising the metrics in Hilbert space
introduced in Section 5.1. By making use of the eigenvector information, distances
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λk -84.85 84.85 0 0 0
| z | φ(z) | z | φ(z) | z | φ(z) | z | φ(z) φ(z) | z |
xk
0.71 0 0.71 3.14 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.35 0 0.35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.35 0 0.35 3.14 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.35 0 0.35 3.14 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.35 0 0.35 3.14 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5.3: Eigensystem for A3 described in Table 5.33 with z = |z|eiφ









Figure 5.9: Visualisation of the eigensystem in Table 5.3
between the subspaces of the eigensystem can be calculated. This groups and or-
ders the patterns by their dominant and associate subspaces of their corresponding
vertices for further interpretation and possible detection of subgroups of manipula-
tive traders. As the traders’ trading actions are encoded within the subspaces, a
clustering of the traders with regard to centralised structures can be accomplished.
Taken the ideas of Section 5.1 and given the eigensystem of H we take the set of
positive eigen values Λ+ with λ+1 , λ
+
2 , . . . , λ
+
l and their corresponding eigenvectors
X+ with x+1 ,x
+
2 , . . . ,x
+










As we work in Hilbert space, distances are defined by scalar products. So with this
matrix R and its complex conjugate transpose we build the scalar product matrix
S with s ∈ C, S = S∗ and
Sn×n = RR
∗. (5.35)
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Following Equation 5.24 the distance between the vectors is minimal if Re (〈ri|rj〉)
is maximal for ‖ri‖ = ‖rj‖ = 1 or Re (〈ri|rj〉) ≤ 1 where 〈ri|rj〉 denotes the distance
of two points in an l-dimensional subspace.
Section 5.1 mentions that all information of the underlying network is maintained
in the combination of projectors Pi and eigenvalues Λ, so the scalar product matrix
of equation 5.35 holds all structural information contained in the eigenvectors X+











with sjk denoting the sum of the components of the respective projector weighted
by the square of the respective positive eigenvalue λm.
Following [Hose 07b] we find clusters qk within the scalar product matrix S by as-
signing the vertices of the network to the cluster with cluster centre x+j such that
a vertex i belongs to a cluster qk if Re(siqk) = maxjRe(sij). As to Equation 5.7
at least one of the eigenvalues of X has to be different to 0, l and therefore the
minimum number of clusters is at least one, at most n− 1 for the analysed network.
6. Analysis
Having described transaction networks in general in Chapter 4 with their representa-
tion as graphs (cp. Section 4.2) or adjacency matrices (cp. Section 4.1), this chapter
describes the relevant network structures of prediction markets built by the basic
entities inherent to such a market in Section 6.1 by means of formal graph theory.
In Section 6.2 abstract graph structures are shown that describe several types of
trading-behaviour within a market. The closing remarks of the analysis chapter
in Section 6.3 present procedures for fraud detection by means of the introduced
analysis technique. The procedures make use of the structural characteristics of the
eigensystem in relation to the underlying graph structure as described in Section 5.3.
6.1 Network Definition and Formation
As in a stock market traders in a prediction market exchange shares and money.
The exchange is usually accomplished by having a market mechanism conducting
the transactions either for all shares or each share type separately but without the
traders being informed about their counterpart in any transaction. This anonymity
in trading networks and trading towards the system is described in detail in Sec-
tion 3.4 and is depicted by Figure 3.3. Shares, money and the market mechanism
are called the entities of the market. To achieve communication networks with di-
rect communication between the traders, we acquire direct connections among the
traders from the transaction data of the market (matched trading activities of the
traders towards the market) that are available within the market system as depicted
by Figure 6.1. These direct connections are then organised into several networks.
Following [Fran 06] a stock market and its moneyflows can be modelled as an ac-
counting system in which a simple transaction record has the form



































Figure 6.1: Accounts within a market system with transactions of Figure 3.3
This describes the transaction flows of an <amount> from the <debit account> to
the <credit account>. Expressing additionally also the stock market’s full informa-
tion on traded shares in the same manner requires a small transformation. Without
loss of information all stock market actions can be expressed in an modified account-
ing system solely by simple transaction records like
RECORD <debit share account>, <credit share account>, <x>
with <x> denoting the quantity of a share to be exchanged between a
<debitshare account> and a <credit share account> and
RECORD <debit monetary account>, <credit monetary account>, <p × x>
with the monetary units as price p multiplied by the quantity x flowing from the
<debit monetary account> to the <credit monetary account>. For the transaction
data given in Figure 3.3 the matched orders result after elimination of the matching
mechanism of the share in the accounting records with the transaction number as
prefix:
• (1) RECORD <Trader A Monetary>, <Trader C Monetary>, <10>
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• (2) RECORD <Trader C Share1>, <Trader A Share1>, <2>
• (3) RECORD <Trader C Monetary>, <Trader B Monetary>, <10>
• (4) RECORD <Trader B Share3>, <Trader C Share3>, <2>
• (5) RECORD <Trader D Monetary>, <Trader C Monetary>, <40>
• (6) RECORD <Trader C Share1>, <Trader D Share1>, <8>.
These transaction records are illustrated with 9 accounts in Figure 6.1 with the
transaction records grouped by traders and the attached transaction number.
As the objective here is the analysis of trading patterns we are primarily inter-
ested in the analysis of the transaction networks namely the networks of moneyflow
and shareflow. For this reason we focus on the cumulated flow quantities money
and shares separately and split up the total accounting system’s network into sub-
networks of total moneyflow, total shareflow, sharewise moneyflow and sharewise
shareflow. The generation of these submarkets is described by the following sub-
sets. As not all information is traceable by the basic accounting system as described
above, the market system has to be expanded to the tracking of these parameters.
Especially the accounts have to be splitted up into a debit and a credit share account
for each trader. The full market network derived from the market accounting system
in Figure 6.1 is given in Figure 6.2. Within the figures the monetary units are de-
scribed as MU. A moneyflow is for example expressed by “2 * 2 MU = 4 MU” which
describes the flow of two times two monetary units which results in four monetary
units in total. A shareflow is given by “2 Share1 @ 2 MU” which describes the flow
of two shares of Share1 at the price of two monetary units.
Trader D
Trader C
8 Share1 @ 5 MU
8 * 5 MU = 40 MU
Trader A
2 * 5 MU = 10 MU
2 Share1 @ 5 MU
Trader B
2 Share3 @ 5 MU
2 * 5 MU = 10 MU
Figure 6.2: Full market network derived from market accounting system in Figure 6.1
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6.1.1 Global Moneyflow Network
Considering only the flow of monetary units (MU) between the traders in the market,
the network is described by the graph GM =
{
V T , EM , ωM
}
with the traders V T
as the vertices, the flows of money EM as edges and the weight of the edge as the
amount of money wMi,j exchanged by the two traders i and j represented by the
two connected vertices vi and vj. The monetary flow for a transaction thereby is
defined as share price times order volume which results in the network depicted by
Figure 6.3. The information taken from the total accounting system are the records
conforming to
RECORD <debit account>, <credit account>, <amount>
or from the modified accounting system according to
RECORD <debit monetary account>, <credit monetary account>, <p × x>.
Trader D
Trader C
8 * 5 MU = 40 MU
Trader A
2 * 5 MU = 10 MU
Trader B
2 * 5 MU = 10 MU
Figure 6.3: Global moneyflow network as subnetwork of the full market network in
Figure 6.2
6.1.2 Global Shareflow Network
The shares exchanged within the system can be modeled as the shareflow network
which is expressed by the graph GS =
{
V T , EQ, ωQ
}
with Q designating the flow of
shares. This subnetwork is depicted by Figure 6.4 whose information is taken from
the modified accounting system records conforming to
RECORD <debit share account>, <credit share account>, <x>
with the share accounts of all traders for that share.
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Trader D
Trader C
8 Share1 @ 5 MU
Trader A
2 Share1 @ 5 MU
Trader B
2 Share3 @ 5 MU
Figure 6.4: Global shareflow network as subnetwork of the full market network in
Figure 6.2
6.1.3 Sharewise Moneyflow Network
Restricting the previously built networks to the money flows of only one type of
shares results in GMs =
{




with s ∈ S = {s1, . . . , sn} denoting one of
the n types of shares within the market. GMs describes one network for each share
within the market and is illustrated by Figure 6.5. Within the total accounting
system this network represents the records conforming to
RECORD <debit account>, <credit account>, <amounts>
or in the the modified accounting system according to
RECORD <debit monetary accounts>, <credit monetary accounts>, <p× x>
with <debit monetary accounts> denoting the accounting system entries within the
monetary accounts of traders that were involved in transactions of a certain share s.
6.1.4 Sharewise Shareflow Network
The second flow quantity within a stock market is the number of shares exchanged
among the traders. Taken as a separate network, this results in the graph represen-
tation GSs =
{




with again the traders V T as vertices, but this time
with the shareflows EQ of share s as edges and the sum of shares ωQ
s
of share s
exchanged between the two vertices connected to the edge as the weight of this edge.
The modified accounting system’s records information used to build up this network
are records conforming to




8 * 5 MU = 40 MU
Trader A
2 * 5 MU = 10 MU
Figure 6.5: Sharewise moneyflow network as subnetwork of the full market network
in Figure 6.2
which results in the graph depicted by Figure 6.6.
Trader D
Trader C
8 Share1 @ 5 MU
Trader A
2 Share1 @ 5 MU
Figure 6.6: Sharewise shareflow network for Share1 as subnetwork of the full market
network in Figure 6.2
6.1.5 Summary
After having extracted direct transaction networks among the traders we are now
able to describe the fraudulent actions from Section 3.3 in terms of transaction
patterns. The acquired transaction networks provide an appropriate basis to describe
the patterns with regard to their selective appearance.
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6.2 Manipulation Patterns
As described in Section 3.3 the patterns looked for are motivated by incentive in-
compatibility as described in Section 3.2. We distinguish the following two types of
fraudulent traders:
1. Money transfer manipulator (“I want a higher rank”)
2. Price manipulator (“I want to signal”)
To differentiate between these types we describe the actions taken by a regular
trader, a trader trying to rank himself better and a signalling trader by means of
the notations introduced in Section 4.3. Behaviour in a market is expressed by the
trading of shares among the traders which results in money and shareflows with
the relevant networks introduced in Section 6.1. All traders within a prediction
market system leave their marks in certain transaction patterns. All patterns define
structures within transaction networks derivable from the transaction records of the
accounting system underlying a market as mentioned in Section 6.1. In the case of
traders misbehaving in a way described in Section 3.3, their actions are based on
the patterns described in the following.
As mentioned in Section 3.4 traders in markets considered here usually act anony-
mously. The anonymity is linked to the amount of liquidity of the market. The less
order activity there is, the less anonymity is present. In a liquid market, a market
with high order activity, the market reacts on all new bid and ask offers that lie
beyond the current price for each case in a very short time period (seconds). In such
a situation the traders are barely aware of their counterpart within a transaction
even if the depth of the order book is high (see Section 3.4). So, almost none of the
traders of can tell its counterpart in a transaction and the set of their transactions
describes a quite balanced network structure. Figure 6.7 illustrates this liquid and
illiquid times of a market by the spread which can be narrow (high activity) or wide
(low activity).
In the following we describe the patterns using the measures vertex degree and vertex
flow from Section 4.3 in the context of the networks described in Section 6.1. Thus
we limit the measures to shares i.e. the edges being bound to a certain share s with
respect of money or quantity denoted by superscription with S, s or M respectively
i.e. δs,inflow(v) for the inbound shareflow of share s for vertex v or δ
S|M,out
deg (v) for the
outbound vertex degrees with respect to the total money or share flow.
The fact from Section 5.3.1 that the results of the eigen analysis contains all infor-
mation that was put into the calculation enables the description of the manipulative
patterns in terms of the eigensystem. The main patterns describing the network are
usually found by analysing the eigenvectors corresponding to the largest absolute







narrow spread wide spread
Figure 6.7: Spread of the share for Germany in the Euro-08 championships
thereby depicted by centralised structures that contain one or more vertices depend-
ing on the actions of the manipulator towards the network which are given at the
end of each pattern description.
6.2.1 Regular Trading
In a market with regular trading behaviour of all traders the anonymity of all trad-
ing partners is fully maintained (even in non-liquid periods) and the transaction
network has approximately balanced trades among the active traders. The trading
partners are chosen by the system with respect to the open orders within the rel-
evant order book. So generating the networks in Section 6.1 for an active market
with a sufficient trading history evenness can be assumed and roughly approximated
by a transaction graph of the active traders showing a quite complete structures
i.e. strongly connected with balanced connections for each of all vertices
δ
M |S,in
deg (vi) ≈ δ
M |S,out
deg (vi) (6.1)
as well as within the share and money flow counts for the vertices
δ
M |S,out
flow (u) ≈ δ
M |S,in
flow (u) (6.2)
see Section 4.3). This structure is generated by regular traders that act hetero-
geneously (arbitrage traders, fundamental traders) and itself may produce strong
deviations from this description due to the amount of heterogeneity. However, the
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structure will change in the moment the market is penetrated by traders with mali-
cious intentions.
6.2.2 Money Transfer Pattern
Following Section 3.3 the pattern of malicious intentions emanates the market in-
ternal incentive system where in the case of play money markets the cost of trad-
ing according to the market rules can be significantly higher than the cost of ma-
nipulating. Here the trader tries to augment the monetary depot value of his
own trading account by trying to transfer money from other accounts controlled
by him (multiple identity accounts, accounts of other traders collaborating with
him). In terms of patterns we refer to this pattern as the money transfer pat-
tern. Within the transaction networks from Section 6.1 this pattern manifests it-
self in vertices with strong asymmetric flow counts in the global moneyflow net-
work (high inbound money flow count for the vertex in favour of the manipula-
tion, δM,inflow (u)  δ
M,out
flow (u)), which is usually bound to few other selfcontrolled or





deg (u)→ |{accounts controlled by u} |). These traders try
to bypass the market inherent anonymity (cp. Section 3.4) to point out the counter-
part of a certain order placed to the order book and thereby controlling the transac-
tion flow. Low liquidity and trading volume in certain shares strongly supports this
fraudulent activity by opening space for breaking the described market and order
book inherent anonymity. This is possible in markets during times of low activity
i.e. during nighttime - with respect to the time zone of a locally operated market.
The transactions of the center of the structure to the other traders is dependent to
the extent this trader tries to ’cover’ his actions among regular behaviour, but is
systematically lower than the ties with his associates.
In Figure 6.8 the graph of such a network is given exemplarily with a group of three
fraudulent traders where one is favoured by the fraudulent actions. The fraudulent
trader favoured by the manipulation here has balanced moneyflows to other traders
but high moneyflows from accomplices. With respect to the center vertex the group
appears as a strong centralised inbound structure with strong inbound moneyflows
from a small number of other vertices (accomplices). During runtime of a market
these actions result in high positions of these traders in the depot value ranking.
Figure 6.9 shows a ranking with the assumed fraudulent traders marked “(RV)” for
Regelverletzung (german for rule breaching) on top 20 positions as described in Sec-
tion 3.3 (the total ranking had 2099 depot value entries).
The pattern within the eigensystem
The intention of a behaviour that tries to get a better rank lies in gathering as much

















Figure 6.8: Example of traders acting conforming to a money transfer pattern
to have a good position in the ranking as the higher the position there, the better
the reward. This can be detected by analysing the global moneyflow network GM
described in Section 6.1.1. Here the vertex showing a manipulative behaviour of
getting a better rank depicts the center of a star-like structure. The trader depicted
by the central vertex is thereby hand in glove with vertices he is directly connected
with. The direction of the moneyflow is inbound to the manipulating vertex in
favour of the manipulation, so the centre of the star-like structure.
6.2.3 Price Manipulation Pattern
Compared with the motivation to get a higher rank, the signalling manipulator acts
not for his own account (or account of a certain group), but is even willing to give
up personal assets for the real world’s incentive i.e. the favoured party winning.
The intention of acting is to influence the market value of a certain share, lowering
or heightening the share’s price to a level different from the price that would be
reached without the manipulation. This is achieved by large buy or sell offers of the
given share. In terms of patterns we refer to this pattern as the price manipulation
pattern. While the share is being manipulated it is called overvalued or undervalued,
repectively, while the wrong rating is created by the efforts of a single trader or a
(small) group of traders.
Price manipulation shows up in the sharewise shareflow network structures described
in Section 6.1.4. Vertices of traders acting in the described way buy (overrating,
heightening the share’s price) or sell (underrating, lowering the share’s price) large
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Figure 6.9: User ranking of the prediction market for the 2007 elections for the na-
tional parliament in Switzerland with traders assumed to manipulate being marked
(RV) (cp. Section 3.3)
amounts of shares from or to arbitrary other traders. The type of the network thus
reflects the transactions of the share the manipulative actions are accomplished in.
In Figure 6.10 a shareflow network for share Share3 is described as it could be ex-
tracted from a market system following Section 6.1.4. If the depicted connections to
the central trader (Fraudulent Trader) are all connections of this trader with respect
to share Share3 a price manipulation pattern can be assumed. Here the fraudulent
trader tries to act in only one direction namely either outbound or inbound. The
pattern structure can be described as centralised with regular amounts of connec-
tions to other traders but notably stronger outbound than inbound shareflows in
case of lowering the price or stronger inbound than outbound shareflows in case of
increasing the price (cp. Section 3.3.2). During runtime of a market an external in-
dication for this pattern can be found in a notable difference between the price of a
certain share in the market and the course of the same share within other forecasting
systems like polls.
The pattern within the eigensystem
Transactions based on signalling intentions differ from the ones motivated by in-
creasing the rank as the goal of the manipulation. Here the actions target the shares
or more exactly one specific share with the manipulative actions aiming at the over-
valuation or undervaluation of the share’s price. So the patterns are to be found in
the results of the sharewise shareflow networks GSs described in Section 6.1.4. The
depot of the manipulative trader thereby depicts strong inbound or outbound flows




400 Share3 @ 6 MU
Trader
200 Share3 @ 5,43 MU
Trader
2000 Share3 @ 5,13 MU
Figure 6.10: Example for a trader acting conforming to a price manipulation pattern
6.3 Procedures
On the basis of the proposed patterns and their characteristics in the eigensystem
procedures are described that serve the purpose of finding these strucures within the
eigensystem. First, the patterns are sought with threshold variables introduced for
defining the accuracy of the search with respect to the ’pureness’ of the patterns. In
the second part the eigensystem is analysed by the clustering methods described in
Section 5.3.3. By metrics that give information about vertices belonging to certain
structures relations among the vertices and information about the transaction flow
within that structure are determined.
6.3.1 Pattern Search
Having in mind the pattern descriptions of Section 6.2 structured procedures for
analysing the eigensystem of a transaction network and its meanings are described.
The procedure in a first step detects basic structures introduced in Section 6.2 by the
analysis of the spectrum of the eigensystem. In a second step details about the found
structures are discovered by analysing the eigenvectors corresponding to the relevant
eigenvalues found in the first step. Thereby the vertices of the network relevant for
the structure are found by a systematic comparison of the eigenvectors’ components.
Also information of the direction of flows is unveiled by the components’ complex
phase information which hints at the source of actions. So which trader originally
affects the structure most, is identified. In the following listing the items describe
the steps of the procedure.
The required configuration parameters for the described procedures are:
• x depicting the cumulated variance percentage the relevant eigenvalues should
cover,
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• δ1 depicting a threshold for accuracy in selecting corresponding eigenvalues,
• δ2 depicting a threshold for accuracy in selecting corresponding anchors,
• δ3 depicting a threshold for accuracy in selecting corresponding members.
1. Find patterns: Analyse the spectrum
(a) Sort subspaces according to their importance
• Order eigenvalues by absolute value (see Equation 5.13).
(b) Decide about relevant patterns
• Select the set of eigenvalues that cover x percent of the data variance
(see Equation 5.19).
(c) Find patterns with a certain accuracy δ
• Find corresponding eigenvalues i ∈ R+ and j ∈ R− with |λi| ≈ |λj| or
||λi| − |λj|| ≤ δ1, respectively, with δ1 depicting the given threshold
for accuracy.
2. Find out details about the patterns: Analyse eigenvectors corresponding to
the matched eigenvalues λi and λj
(a) Find the central trader in the structure (anchor)
• Check phase information of the largest eigenvector component xim
with Abs(xim) = maxk Abs(xik) of xi against phase information of the
same eigenvector component xjm within other corresponding eigen-
vectors xj. If the phase information is less than a given threshold δ2,
ϕ(xim, xjm) ≤ δ2, then they are corresponding and thus m is the cen-
tral trader or anchor within this structure denoted by the subspace.
(b) Find traders that belong to the structure (members)
• Check phase information of the other eigenvector components xin
with n 6= m of xi against the phase information of the other eigen-
vector components xjn with n 6= m of xj. If the absolute difference
of phase information difference ϕ (xin, xjn) and π is less than a given
threshold δ3, |π − ϕ(xin, xjn)| ≤ δ3, then they are corresponding and
thus belong to the same structure as members.
(c) Discover details about the direction of communication within the pattern
• For a member n the two corresponding eigenvector components xin
and xjn the direction of communication flow towards or from the
central trader can be detected with
◦ π − ϕ(xio, xjo) < 0 for flows towards the centre node (inbound
with respect to the centre node).
◦ π−ϕ(xio, xjo) > 0 for flows from the centre node (outbound with
respect to the centre node).
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6.3.2 Clustering
To enhance the basic procedure of finding the described structures within the eigen-
system we apply the clustering technique introduced in Section 5.3.3.
Taken the descriptions of manipulative trading patterns within an eigensystem in
Section 6.2 the search for these patterns can be described as procedures for system-
atically analysing the eigensystem. The procedures make use of the characteristics
like strengths of eigenvalues and direction of eigenvectors within the eigensystem to
identify the two fraud patterns investigated. Following Section 5.1 Euclidian dis-
tances among the subspaces denoted by the eigenvectors X are calculated which
provide a fast solution to the complex task of a structured comparison described
in the Section 6.3.1, resulting in assignments of vertices to their subnetworks. The
clustering technique reorders the eigensystem regarding the structural most central
vertices and calculates the members of the subnetworks of these centres as described
in Section 5.1.
A structured procedure for analysing the eigensystem and thus the network according
to Section 5.3.3 is depicted by the following steps. Again the items describe the steps
of the procedure.
1. Calculate the scalar product matrix
• Build the scalar product matrix S as depicted by Equation 5.35.
2. Discover structural groups by relevant relations between vertices.
• Find the most prominent vertices and assign counterparts by least dis-
tances within the scalar product matrix S and the procedure described
at the bottom of Section 5.3.3.
6.4 Summary
As we have seen in this chapter the market system by default does not provide
the direct trader-to-trader transaction data needed for the analysis of transaction
networks proposed in Chapter 4. We introduce the network definitions needed for
the proposed analysis in Section 6.1 and their derivation from an abstract accounting
system. The manipulation patterns based on the fraudulent actions introduced in
Section 3.3 are then described with regard to their appearance within these networks
and in the context and appearance in the resulting eigensystems in Section 6.2.
All characteristics of these appearances are then summarised in the procedures for
finding patterns within the eigensystem of the proposed networks in Section 6.3.
7. Application in Prediction
Markets
Within this chapter the ideas of the last chapter are applied to simulation market
data in Section 7.1 and data from real world markets in Section 7.2. Both, simulation
and real world markets result in transaction networks that are analysed and discussed
by the techniques and interpretations introduced in Chapter 6. The simulation was
conducted using a software framework written in JAVA1 and MATHEMATICA2.
For the real world data a market system written in PHP3 was utilised.
7.1 Simulation Data
For the purpose of analysing simulated market data comparable to the transaction
network evolving in real world markets we first assume the simulated market data
to be free of the described manipulative actions (cp. Section 6.2.1). We then in-
troduce perturbations on this regular market structure and display the changes in
the eigensystem. As an intended perturbation we introduce the money transfer pat-
tern described in Section 6.2.2 resulting mainly from the market’s inherent incentive
system (see Section 3.3.1). Additionally a rough approximation of the boundaries
of changes in the spectrum due to such a perturbation is given in Section 7.1.2.
Finally the price manipulation pattern described in Section 6.2.3 is added to the
regular trading pattern which mainly results from incentive incompatibility in the
super-game described in Section 3.3.2.
For each of the simulations the original simulated adjacency matrix showing the
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a Hermitian adajacency matrix following the description in Section 5.2. For this
matrix the eigensystem is calculated resulting in a set of eigenvalues and their cor-
responding eigenvectors which for the simulated graphs is given in total as a tabular
listing ordered by the descending absolute eigenvalues. Following the result of the
eigensystem calculation the real and absolute values distribution of the eigenvalues
is given. As the relevance of the eigenvalues in terms of their information content
can be described by means of the variance the cumulated variance is given to each
of the eigensystems resulting from the simulations. To retain clarity the simulated
markets are built with 20 traders which results in presentable data. Each simulation
is shown in two exemplary runs with varied parameters followed by the results of
several simulation runs to demonstrate the stability of the eigensystem. For simula-
tion purposes we take only parts of a market, thus accepting slight violations of the
accounting system i.e. the balance sheet total has to be zero. As we only intend to
show the impact of perturbation on markets this can be considered as an acceptable
approximation.
The parts of this section consist of the following simulations:
1. Regular Market Activity (Section 7.1.1)
• Analysis of a network of a regular market environment (pages 72 to 81)
◦ Adjacency matrix, eigensystem, spectrum, cumulated variance, and
eigensystem visualisation in Figures 7.1 to 7.5
◦ Spectra and cumulated variance of multiple simulations in Figures 7.6
and 7.7
• Analysis of a network of a regular market environment with an increased
standard deviation of the connection weights (pages 77 to 81)
◦ Adjacency matrix, eigensystem, spectrum, cumulated variance, and
eigensystem visualisation in Figures 7.8 to 7.12
◦ Spectra and cumulated variance of multiple simulations in Figures 7.13
and 7.14
2. Money Transfer Pattern (Section 7.1.2)
• Analysis of a regular market with money transfer perturbation (pages 83
to 87)
◦ Adjacency matrix, eigensystem, spectrum, cumulated variance, and
eigensystem visualisation in Figures 7.15 to 7.19
◦ Spectra and cumulated variance of multiple simulations in Figures 7.38
and 7.39
• Analysis of a regular market with an increased standard deviation of the
connection weights and a money transfer perturbation (pages 88 to 94)
◦ Adjacency matrix, eigensystem, spectrum, cumulated variance, and
eigensystem visualisation in Figures 7.22 to 7.26
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◦ Spectra and cumulated variance of multiple simulations in Figures 7.45
and 7.46
• Simulations for lower and upper bounds of structural change in spectrum
◦ Spectra and cumulated variance of multiple simulations of a lower
and upper bound for the regular market with money transfer pattern
in Figures 7.29 and 7.30
◦ Spectra and cumulated variance of multiple simulations of a lower
and upper bound for the regular market with an increased standard
deviation of the connection weights with money transfer pattern in
Figures 7.31 and 7.32
3. Price Manipulation Pattern (Section 7.1.3)
• Analysis of a regular market with price manipulation perturbation (pages
96 to 100)
◦ Adjacency matrix, eigensystem, spectrum, cumulated variance, and
eigensystem visualisation in Figures 7.33 to 7.37
◦ Spectra and cumulated variance of multiple simulations in Figures 7.38
and 7.39
• Analysis of a regular market with an increased standard deviation of the
connection weights and a price manipulation perturbation (pages 101 to
107)
◦ Adjacency matrix, eigensystem, spectrum, cumulated variance, and
eigensystem visualisation in Figures 7.40 to 7.44
◦ Spectra and cumulated variance of multiple simulations in Figures 7.45
and 7.46
• Simulations for lower and upper bounds of structural change in spectrum
◦ Spectra and cumulated variance of multiple simulations of a lower and
upper bound for the regular market with price manipulation pattern
in Figures 7.47 and 7.48
◦ Spectra and cumulated variance of multiple simulations of a lower
and upper bound for the regular market with an increased standard
deviation of the connection weights with price manipulation pattern
in Figures 7.49 and 7.50
4. Multiple Patterns (Section 7.1.4)
• Analysis of a regular market with a perturbation by multiple patterns
(pages 109 to 113)
◦ Adjacency matrix, eigensystem, spectrum, cumulated variance, and
eigensystem visualisation in Figures 7.51 to 7.55
◦ Spectra and cumulated variance of multiple simulations in Figures 7.56
and 7.57
• Analysis of a regular market with an increased standard deviation of the
connection weights and a perturbation by multiple patterns (pages 114
to 118)
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◦ Adjacency matrix, eigensystem, spectrum, cumulated variance, and
eigensystem visualisation in Figures 7.58 to 7.62
◦ Spectra and cumulated variance of multiple simulations in Figures 7.63
and 7.64.
7.1.1 Regular Market Activity
As shown in Section 3.4 the traders within a market of interest act anonymous
towards the market system and therefore do regularly not know any of the matched
trading partners. As the matching algorithm within such a market does only match
by formal rules and not semantic likes or dislikes of certain traders or aspects of
traders, the connections among the traders within the trader-trader network are
arbitrary. As a transaction network evolves over time these arbitrary set connections
add up to a joint connection value. Thus for the simulation networks the connection
strengths are assumed to be identically normally distributed with an average strength
depending on the trading activity of the individual trader. Thus for a regular market,
a market with no fraudulent or manipulation activity, the transaction network results
in a complete graph structure.
Simulating the introduced transaction setting we obtain e.g. the graph structure
listed in the adjacency matrices in Figures 7.1 and 7.8. The transaction matrices
were built by means of connections chosen randomly from a normal distribution with
different standard deviations σ.
Following the simulation of the market’s transaction data we calculate the eigen-
system of the adjacency matrices which before were transformed to the Hermitian
form in the way described in Chapter 6. This results in the eigenvalues and their
corresponding eigenvectors given in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 with the eigenvalues in de-
scending absolute value order. The real value distribution of the normed eigenvalues
sorted by absolute size is given in Figures 7.2 and 7.9. In Figures 7.3 and 7.10 this
distributions are given additionally in absolute values. In the cumulated variance
plots in Figures 7.4 and 7.11 it can be clearly seen that for such a market structure
almost 90 % of the total variance is described by the first eigenvalue. Regarding the
cumulated variance the three largest absolute eigenvalues sum up to around 95 % of
the total variance. The eigensystems in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 depict a complete network
graph. Characteristic for this structure is the lack of corresponding eigenvalues in
the sense of the procedures in Section 6.3. As can be seen the most dominant ele-
ments of the eigenspaces corresponding to the eigenvalues with alternating algebraic
sign are not the same. For the eigensystems in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 this can be seen
in the eigenvectors corresponding to the second and third eigenvalue (alternating
algebraic sign) and their corresponding eigenvectors 2 and 3 (third to sixth column
in upper row) where the main elements are in different components (component 8
in eigenvector 2 and component 5 in eigenvector 3 as indicated by a phase of zero
as the eigenspaces are rotated as described in Section 5.1). As the rest of the eigen-
values’ contributions to the total variances is low and adds no significant structures
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to the main structures, the whole spectra have no significant patterns but the one
of slightly perturbed complete structures (see patterns in the eigensystem in Sec-
tion 5.3.2). Thus the procedures in Section 6.3 do not match eigenvalue pairs with
alternating algebraic signs whose eigenvector components have the required phase
information structure (see procedures in Section 5.3.2).
As introduced in Section 5.3.1 the visualisation of the eigensystems of Figures 7.1
and 7.2 are given in Figures 7.5 and 7.12. Here the complete structures of the
underlying graphs can be clearly assessed by the first eigenvectors (lying in the first
row) and their phases that do not vary much for all eigenvector components. Fig-
ures 7.6 and 7.13 give the result for 10 simulation runs with the same distribution
parameters for each network. They show a stability in the spectrum in the distribu-
tion of the major eigenvalues due to the cumulated variances that are also depicted
in a superimposed way in Figures 7.7 and 7.14. To be able to compare distributions
from the different simulations, the spectra of the simulation runs are superimposed
in Figures 7.6 and 7.13 normed by the spectral norm of Equation 5.11. Variations
in the eigenvalues are almost invisible in Figures 7.6 and 7.7. Even when increasing
the standard deviation considerably, the spectra remain quite stable, although the
variations have increased (Figures 7.13 and 7.14).
As can be seen in the two different network simulation runs in this section, the
spectrum reacts on changes within the input transaction data. The spectrum of the
homogeneous complete graph structure in Figure 7.2 appears quite perfectly accord-
ing to the pattern description in Section 5.3.2 whereas the complete network with an
increasing standard deviation results in a spectrum which appears more structured
as can be seen in the low eigenvalues in Figure 7.9. Now the question arises in how
far structure induced by random trading can be discerned from structure induced
by manipulative trading. To investigate this we induce perturbation similar to the
manipulative trading patterns introduced in Section 6.2. Since manipulative trading
needs to have an impact on either the upper ranks in the depot value ranking (money
transfer pattern) or the market prices (price manipulation pattern) the perturbation
can be assumed to be rather high. The simulations with these two patterns are
presented in the following sections.
72 7. Application in Prediction Markets
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Figure 7.2: Normed eigenvalues of the simulated regular market described in Fig-
ure 7.1









Figure 7.3: Normed eigenvalues of the simulated regular market described in Fig-
ure 7.1 with absolute values
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Figure 7.4: Cumulated variance of the 20 first largest absolute eigenvalues of the
simulated regular market described in Figure 7.1
























Figure 7.5: Eigensystem of the simulated regular market described in Figure 7.1
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Figure 7.6: Superimposed normed eigenvalues of the simulated regular market de-
scribed in Figure 7.1 for 10 simulation runs








Figure 7.7: Superimposed cumulated variances of the 20 first largest absolute eigen-
values of the simulated regular market described in Figure 7.1 for 10 simulation
runs
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Figure 7.9: Normed eigenvalues of the simulated regular market described in Fig-
ure 7.8









Figure 7.10: Normed eigenvalues of the simulated regular market described in Fig-
ure 7.8 with absolute values
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Figure 7.11: Cumulated variance of the 20 first largest absolute eigenvalues of the
simulated regular market described in Figure 7.8
























Figure 7.12: Eigensystem of the simulated regular market described in Figure 7.8
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Figure 7.13: Superimposed normed eigenvalues of the simulated regular market de-
scribed in Figure 7.8 for 10 simulation runs








Figure 7.14: Superimposed cumulated variances of the 20 first largest absolute eigen-
values of the simulated regular market described in Figure 7.8 for 10 simulation runs
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7.1.2 Money Transfer Pattern
In Figures 7.15 and 7.22 the transaction networks of a regular market from the pre-
vious section is perturbed by a strong transaction flow from trader 11 to trader 12
and a low one from trader 12 to trader 11 (depicted by rows and columns 11 and
12, respectively). Again the results of the eigensystem calculation of the Hermitian
adjacency matrix is given in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 and the spectrum distribution in
Figures 7.16, 7.23, 7.17, and 7.24. In comparison to the eigensystem of the undis-
turbed complete communication structures in the previous section the presence of
the added structure results in the changing of the cumulated variance in Figures 7.18
and 7.25. Still the complete structure is present in the first eigenvector correspond-
ing to the first eigenvalue describing about 70 % of the cumulated variance. But
this time two corresponding eigenvalues follow on positions 2 and 3 in the ordered
absolute eigenvalues. Following the procedures in Section 6.3 this is detected by the
alternation of the algebraic sign between the 2nd and 3rd eigenvalue, the quite same
phase for the centre node of the structure and the phase shift of π of the vertices
directly involved in the pattern. Scaled to several runs the eigensystem is stable as
depicted for 10 simulation runs for each network in the cumulated variances in Fig-
ures 7.20 and 7.27 and the spectra in Figures 7.21 and 7.28. In the visualisations in
Figure 7.19 and 7.26 this can be seen in a vivid way by the colour of the eigenvector
components 11 and 12 in the 2nd and 3rd rows.
The impact of a perturbation on the eigensystem for Hermitian matrices can be
shown to follow the following rough boundaries λi+ε1 ≥ βi ≥ λi+εn∀i. This holds for
perturbations of linear form for a Hermitian unperturbed matrix A and a Hermitian
perturbation matrix E. The corresponding eigenvalues are λi ∈ σ (A) , εi ∈ σ (E).
The resulting perturbed matrix B = A+E has the eigenvalues βi [Meye 00, p.551].
Thus the perturbation of a Hermitian matrix A depends on the norm of the per-
turbation matrix E since the norm is equivalent to the maximum eigenvalue of the
Hermitian matrix E. Following this approach it can be shown that a manipulative
trading behaviour becomes visible already by a small perturbation in the input adja-
cency matrix relative to the transactions of the other traders with a small variance.
If on the other hand the market shows comparably large standard deviation, the ma-
nipulative trading behaviour has to be stronger to result in a visible impact. This is
shown in the following examples depicted by Figures 7.29 and 7.30 for the transaction
network described in Figure 7.15 and in Figures 7.31 and 7.32 for the transaction
network described in Figure 7.22. In the examples for each standard deviation a
perturbation with no visible impact on the spectrum (Figures 7.29 and 7.31) and
a perturbation with a visible impact on the spectrum (Figures 7.30 and 7.32) are
shown. Whether the visible perturbation is a manipulative pattern as described can
only be seen by using the eigenvector information as proposed in Section 6.3.
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Figure 7.16: Normed eigenvalues of the simulated market with money transfer pat-
tern described in Figure 7.15









Figure 7.17: Normed eigenvalues of the simulated market with money transfer pat-
tern described in Figure 7.15 with absolute values
86 7. Application in Prediction Markets








Figure 7.18: Cumulated variance of the 20 first largest absolute eigenvalues of the
simulated market with money transfer pattern described in Figure 7.15
























Figure 7.19: Eigensystem of the simulated market with money transfer pattern
described in Figure 7.15
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Figure 7.20: Superimposed normed eigenvalues of the simulated market with money
transfer pattern described in Figure 7.15 for 10 simulation runs








Figure 7.21: Superimposed cumulated variances of the 20 first largest absolute eigen-
values of the simulated market with money transfer pattern described in Figure 7.15
for 10 simulation runs
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Figure 7.23: Normed eigenvalues of the simulated market with money transfer pat-
tern described in Figure 7.22









Figure 7.24: Normed eigenvalues of the simulated market with money transfer pat-
tern described in Figure 7.22 with absolute values
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Figure 7.25: Cumulated variance of the 20 first largest absolute eigenvalues of the
simulated market with money transfer pattern described in Figure 7.22
























Figure 7.26: Eigensystem of a simulated market with money transfer pattern de-
scribed in Figure 7.22
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Figure 7.27: Superimposed normed eigenvalues of the simulated market with money
transfer pattern described in Figure 7.22 for 10 simulation runs








Figure 7.28: Superimposed cumulated variances of the 20 first largest absolute eigen-
values of the simulated market with money transfer pattern described in Figure 7.22
for 10 simulation runs
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Figure 7.29: Superimposed normed eigenvalues of the simulated regular market de-
scribed in Figure 7.1 for 10 simulation runs with a money transfer manipulation
perturbation of 1100 from trader 11 to 12 and −700 from trader 12 to 11









Figure 7.30: Superimposed normed eigenvalues of the simulated regular market de-
scribed in Figure 7.1 for 10 simulation runs with a money transfer manipulation
perturbation of 1300 from trader 11 to 12 and −700 from trader 12 to 11
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Figure 7.31: Superimposed normed eigenvalues of the simulated regular market de-
scribed in Figure 7.8 for 10 simulation runs with a money transfer manipulation
perturbation of 1300 from trader 11 to 12 and −700 from trader 12 to 11










Figure 7.32: Superimposed normed eigenvalues of the simulated regular market de-
scribed in Figure 7.8 for 10 simulation runs with a money transfer manipulation
perturbation of 3900 from trader 11 to 12 and −700 from trader 12 to 11
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7.1.3 Price Manipulation Pattern
For the third simulation we add a price manipulation pattern to the transaction
network activities of Section 7.1.1. The added structures are built by inbound trans-
actions to trader 2 from traders 1, 3, 4, . . . , 20 added to the networks in Figures 7.1
and 7.8 with the strengths given in the captions of the Figures of the perturbed
networks in Figures 7.33 and 7.40. The eigensystems to these networks are given in
Tables 7.5 and 7.5. Compared to the regular market activity and the regular market
with the money transaction perturbation the strengths of the added pattern is the
dominant structure within the spectra depicted by Figures 7.34 and 7.35. This is
stated by the cumulated variances depicted in Figures 7.36 and 7.43 where the first
eigenvalue holds about 85 % of all variance in the data. As in the regular market’s
eigensystems the spectra here have alternating algebraic signs from the 1st to the
2nd eigenvalue, but here the eigenvector components on positions 2 have the same
phase and the ones of the components 1, 3, 4, . . . , 20 are rotated by π which can be
seen in the visualisation of the eigensystem in Figures 7.37 and 7.37 in the first row
(first eigenvector) compared to the second (second eigenvector). Also in this case
the spectra give the same information after the simulation is carried out multiple
times (see Figures 7.38 and 7.45 and Figures 7.39 and 7.39). Since only the norm
of the perturbation matrix is relevant in the case of a star pattern in the price ma-
nipulation pattern the strength of the trading between ego and alters in the star
can be smaller for each pair than within the money transfer pattern. Figures 7.47
and 7.48 and Figures 7.49 and 7.50 give examples for rough lower and upper bounds
of the visibility of the perturbations in the case of a price manipulation pattern with
respect to the configuration of the basic structure from the regular market activities
of Figures 7.1 and 7.8 in Section 7.1.1.
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Figure 7.34: Normed eigenvalues of a simulated market described in Figure 7.33
with price manipulation









Figure 7.35: Normed eigenvalues of the simulated market described in Figure 7.33
with price manipulation with absolute values
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Figure 7.36: Cumulated variance of the 20 first largest absolute eigenvalues of the
simulated market described in Figure 7.33 with price manipulation pattern
























Figure 7.37: Eigensystem of the simulated market described in Figure 7.33 with
price manipulation pattern
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Figure 7.38: Superimposed normed eigenvalues of the simulated market described
in Figure 7.33 for 10 simulation runs with price manipulation pattern








Figure 7.39: Superimposed cumulated variances of the 20 first largest absolute eigen-
values of the simulated market described in Figure 7.33 for 10 simulation runs with
price manipulation pattern
7.1. Simulation Data 101


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.1. Simulation Data 103








Figure 7.41: Normed eigenvalues of the simulated market described in Figure 7.40
with price manipulation









Figure 7.42: Normed eigenvalues of the simulated market described in Figure 7.40
with price manipulation with absolute values
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Figure 7.43: Cumulated variance of the 20 first largest absolute eigenvalues of the
simulated market described in Figure 7.40 with price manipulation pattern
























Figure 7.44: Eigensystem of the simulated market described in Figure 7.40 with
price manipulation pattern
7.1. Simulation Data 105










Figure 7.45: Superimposed normed eigenvalues of the simulated market described
in Figure 7.40 for 10 simulation runs with price manipulation pattern








Figure 7.46: Superimposed cumulated variances of the 20 first largest absolute eigen-
values of the simulated market described in Figure 7.40 for 10 simulation runs with
price manipulation pattern
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Figure 7.47: Superimposed normed eigenvalues of the simulated regular market de-
scribed in Figure 7.1 for 10 simulation runs with a price manipulation perturbation
of 600 to trader 2 from traders 1, 3, 4, . . . , 20










Figure 7.48: Superimposed normed eigenvalues of the simulated regular market de-
scribed in Figure 7.1 for 10 simulation runs with a price manipulation perturbation
of 1300 to trader 2 from traders 1, 3, 4, . . . , 20
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Figure 7.49: Superimposed normed eigenvalues of the simulated regular market de-
scribed in Figure 7.8 for 10 simulation runs with a price manipulation perturbation
of 600 to trader 2 from traders 1, 3, 4, . . . , 20










Figure 7.50: Superimposed normed eigenvalues of the simulated regular market de-
scribed in Figure 7.1 for 10 simulation runs with a price manipulation perturbation
of 1300 to trader 2 from traders 1, 3, 4, . . . , 20
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7.1.4 Multiple Patterns
Finally, as in real markets the discussed patterns are usually not occuring separately,
this simulation focuses on the occurrence of multiple patterns in one set of trans-
action data. For simulation reasons we apply the pattern structures of the money
transfer pattern and the price manipulation pattern as introduced before. Both are
added as a perturbation to the basic structure of the regular market activities from
Section 7.1.1. The building rules for both patterns correspond to the ones used in
Sections 7.1.2 and 7.1.3. As result we again obtain the set of the adjacency ma-
trices (Figures 7.51 and 7.58), the eigensystem listings (Figures 7.7 and 7.8), the
spectra distributions (Figures 7.52 and 7.59, 7.53, and 7.60), the cumulated variance
plots (Figure 7.54 and 7.61), and the visualisations in Figures 7.55 and 7.62. We
can clearly see that the single structures described in the previous sections are still
present. The plots of the cumulated variances in Figures 7.54 and 7.61 show that
the eigenvalues representing the patterns have the highest values and are given in
decreasing order according to their share of the information within the total cov-
ered variances. For multiple runs of the simulation the results are depicted by the
eigenvalues in Figures 7.56 and 7.63 and the variances in Figures 7.57 and 7.64
where the structural variation is quite small and the structural characteristics of
the major eigenvalues like strength and algebraic signs are corresponding in all of
the superimposed spectra. Additionally with the application onto the different ba-
sic characteristics in the networks of the regular market structure in Figures 7.1
and 7.8 we varied the strengths of the added patterns by increasing the structure
of the money transfer pattern and increasing the structure of the price manipula-
tion pattern. This can be seen in the spectra of 10 simulation runs in Figures 7.56
and 7.63 in the first four eigenvalues. In the visualisations in Figures 7.55 and 7.62
the properties of both of the patterns are present. These are the star like structure
from traders 1, 3, 4, . . . , 20 towards trader 2 forming a price manipulation pattern
(lines 1 and 2) and the money transfer pattern between traders 11 and 12 (lines 3
and 4).
7.1. Simulation Data 109
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Figure 7.52: Normed eigenvalues of the simulated market described in Figure 7.51
with price manipulation and money transfer pattern









Figure 7.53: Normed eigenvalues of the simulated market described in Figure 7.51
with price manipulation and money transfer pattern with absolute values
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Figure 7.54: Cumulated variance of the 20 first largest absolute eigenvalues of the
market described in Figure 7.51 with price manipulation money transfer pattern
























Figure 7.55: Eigensystem of the simulated market described in Figure 7.51 with
price manipulation and money transfer pattern
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Figure 7.56: Superimposed normed eigenvalues of the simulated market described in
Figure 7.51 with price manipulation and money transfer pattern for 10 simulation
runs








Figure 7.57: Superimposed cumulated variances of the 20 first largest absolute eigen-
values of the market described in Figure 7.51 with price manipulation money transfer
pattern for 10 simulation runs
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Figure 7.59: Normed eigenvalues of the simulated market described in Figure 7.58
with price manipulation and money transfer pattern









Figure 7.60: Normed eigenvalues of the simulated market described in Figure 7.58
with price manipulation and money transfer pattern with absolute values
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Figure 7.61: Cumulated variance of the 20 first largest absolute eigenvalues of the
market described in Figure 7.58 with price manipulation money transfer pattern
























Figure 7.62: Eigensystem of the simulated market described in Figure 7.58 with
price manipulation and money transfer pattern
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Figure 7.63: Superimposed normed eigenvalues of the simulated market described in
Figure 7.58 with price manipulation and money transfer pattern for 10 simulation
runs








Figure 7.64: Superimposed cumulated variances of the 20 first largest absolute eigen-
values of the market described in Figure 7.58 with price manipulation money transfer
pattern for 10 simulation runs
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7.1.5 Summary
The preceding chapters of this work introduced the transaction patterns resulting
from certain trader behaviours within a prediction market. Within this section these
transaction patterns were simulated separately as perturbations to a basic network
structure and approached by the proposed analysis method. For each of these sce-
narios the results gave a clear identification of the defined patterns and their stability
within the analysis results i.e. the patterns within the spectra. The gap of struc-
tural change within the spectrum due to perturbations in the analysed networks
is approached exemplarily by analysing simulation settings for networks below and
above that gap. Therefore, simulation runs for networks with certain perturbations
(simulating manipulative actions) of the basic structure of a regular market net-
work that do not effect the spectrum structure of a regular market network without
perturbations, and perturbations that do effect the spectrum structure towards the
spectrum structure described for the certain manipulation patterns are given.
The eigensystem of the regular market’s transaction behaviour in Section 7.1.1
described a quite complete network. Adding the transaction patterns for irregu-
lar money transfer and price manipulation to this basic network in Sections 7.1.2
and 7.1.3 result in eigensystems whose analysis result gives clear diagnoses of these
added structures following the required eigensystem structures of Section 6.2 in case
of containing these patterns. Section 7.1.4 finally shows how the structures add up
jointly within the transaction structure as well as in the analysis result. Also here
the patterns are differentiable from the basic regular market behaviour.
With these simulation results at hand the analysis approach is in the following section
applied to real world market data focusing one pattern in each of the markets.
120 7. Application in Prediction Markets
7.2 Real World Market Data
The data from real world markets was collected during the operation of the soft-
ware framework “PSM” (acronym for Political Stock Market) of the Institute for
Information Systems and Management at Universität Karlsruhe (TH) in Germany.
Data from the following markets was analysed in this section:
1. Elections for the Baden-Württemberg state parliament in Germany 2006
2. Elections for the national parliament in Switzerland 2007
The system was operated in cooperation with several media partners. The markets
were communicated as operated by a research unit, but there was no experimental
design disturbing the character of an honest prediction market. The participants
traded in markets with an incentive system where attractive prices could be won
by traders with the highest final depot values. Because of the system design of the
software PSM, full datasets with all trading information document each action of
traders within the market.
Below we describe and analyse the market designs in detail. In the first market for
the state parliament in Baden-Württemberg the focus was on the money transfer
pattern, in the market for the national parliament in Switzerland on price manipu-
lation. As abbreviation for ’monetary unit’ MU is used instead.
7.2.1 Elections for the Baden-Württemberg State Parlia-
ment in Germany 2006
The market for the elections for the Baden-Württemberg state parliament in Ger-
many was conducted with four partners coming from the newspaper business, namely
Badische Zeitung in Freiburg, Badische Neueste Nachrichten in Karlsruhe, Stuttgarter
Zeitung in Stuttgart and Heilbronner Stimme in Heilbronn. The participants were
mainly customers of these media partners, so mainly readers of rather serious and
politically balanced newspapers all over the election region. In addition the trader
group contained some participants from previous markets. The market ran from
January, 31st 2006 until election day on March, 26th 2006 for about twelve weeks
and was stopped with the closing time of the polling stations at 18:00 CET when
the first official information on the voter’s decision was allowed to be released. More
detailed data about the market is given in Table 7.9.
Within the area of market manipulations this market was not interrupted by mar-
ket surveillance during runtime. Participants blamed for having manipulated the
market were excluded from the lottery without being informed during runtime. All
participants were informed on these efforts to find out about manipulators and the
consequent exclusion by the terms and conditions of the market.
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Market opening 2006-01-12 16:23:44
Market close 2006-03-26 18:00:00
Number of traders (at least one sell or buy transaction) 306 traders
Number of traders (at least one sell transaction) 190 traders
Number of traders (at least one buy transaction) 291 traders
Number of transactions 10786 transactions
Number of shares 7 shares
Average volume per trade 214.6 shares
Average moneyflow per trade 2, 462.1 MU
Moneyflow in total 26, 556, 378 MU
Shareflow in total 2, 314, 197 shares







Figure 7.65: Prices of the market for the 2006 state parliament elections in Baden-
Württemberg in Germany
7.2.1.1 Analysis
As the subject of the analysis in this section is the money transfer pattern introduced
in Section 6.2.2, the global moneyflow network of the market (see Section 6.1.1) is ex-
tracted from the market’s transaction data. For this market the existence of a money
transfer manipulation could be assumed as the depot values of the most prominent
positions in the highscore, especially the one of the trader with nickname “elfriede”,
were exceeding a value which was plausible with regard to the other trader’s depot
values (cp. Table 7.10).
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5 potato joe 164285.52
6 Maio Shan 156898.10
7 Ritvars 155599.08
8 henning 147850.64
Table 7.10: First 8 highest ranks in the highscore for the market for the 2006 state
parliament elections in Baden-Württemberg in Germany
Following Section 6.2.2 an irregular trading pattern is given by a strong asymmetric
total moneyflow among two traders which themselves have little or below other
connections to other traders of the network. Now analysing this market transaction
data in the manner of the simulations in Section 7.1, the eigensystem results in 306
eigenvalues out of which the 21 largest absolute values are displayed with their real
values in Table 7.11. The spectrum in total is given in Figure 7.67 (ordered by the
descending absolute values) and in Figure 7.68 with absolute values.
λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4 λ5 λ6
1058206.58 -1031266.15 524487.49 -372072.73 258457.61 -253073.92
λ7 λ8 λ9 λ10 λ11 λ12
243497.00 -228817.40 201615.16 -201527.61 -191045.04 182719.01
λ13 λ14 λ15 λ16 λ17 λ18
-176745.81 163198.67 156091.17 -150107.99 141420.50 -140327.93
λ19 λ20 λ21
133133.33 -129003.39 127808.00
Table 7.11: First 21 largest absolute eigenvalues of the market for the 2006 state
parliament elections in Baden-Württemberg in Germany
These eigenvalues have 306 corresponding eigenvectors with each having 306 eigen-
vector components which again split up in absolute value and phase information.
As to the page boundaries of this work the full eigensystem of dimensions 306× 306
cannot displayed properly, the visualisation introduced in Section 5.3.1 can help to
get an insight into the structure of the eigensystem. The eigenvectors xi can be
found in the rows with each column j corresponding to the eigenvector component
xij. The eigenvectors are thereby ordered top down by their corresponding absolute
eigenvalues λi in descending order. As the k
th eigenvalue λk is assumed to be a
weighting factor for the subspace build by the kth eigenvector xk and thus as an
indicator of importance of this subspace, the eigenvectors lying on top represent the
most interesting subspaces holding the main structural information of the graph’s
structure. As can be seen in the plot of the cumulated variance in Figure 7.69 already
the eight largest absolute eigenvalues cover about 80 % of the total variance. As the
eigenvalues of these are alternating in the algebraic sign, a first indicator for strong
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star-like structures is given. Following the pattern search procedures of Section 6.3
we find quite clear phase shifts in the corresponding eigenvectors which support the
star-like structure and additionally identify the direction of each structure.
Visually this result can easily be verified if the eigensystem is processed by the
cluster algorithm as introduced in Section 5.3.3 and applied in Section 6.3. The
subspaces’ components are thereby reordered according to information of ’closeness’
of a variable within all subspaces. Thus the central vertices of the found patterns
are ordered by their relevance with the related vertices in the found pattern lying
next to them. The reassembled eigenvectors are shown in Figure 7.70 where the
eigenvectors still build the rows, but with the eigenvector components rearranged in
the described manner. In comparison to Figure 7.66 the corresponding eigenvectors’
corresponding components are gathered next to each other. As in the case of the
sought structures their phases have a shift of 0 if they are centre and a shift of π if
they are alters to the centre, the resulting colour change information can be taken
from the colour table in Figure 5.1. A phase of 0 is indicated by red, a phase of π
by cyan.
As an example for the found patterns within the total moneyflow network Fig-
ures 7.71 and 7.72 show the total network for the traders 1922 ( ’elfriede’) and 1816
(’henning’). Both traders are supposed to manipulate by the money transfer pattern
with trader 1922 collaborating with 3 other traders (traders 1898, 1858, and 1775)
and trader 1816 collaborating with 2 (traders 1826 and 1831). The actions towards
the regular market of traders 1922 and 1816 differs as trader 1922 trades only little
with traders not collaborating with him but trader 1816 behaves as a trader with
balanced trading volumes to the rest of the market beside his allies.
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Figure 7.67: Normed eigenvalues of the global moneyflow network of the market for
the 2006 state parliament elections in Baden-Württemberg in Germany
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Figure 7.68: Normed eigenvalues of the global moneyflow network of the market
for the 2006 state parliament elections in Baden-Württemberg in Germany with
absolute values








Figure 7.69: Cumulated variance of the global moneyflow network of the 20 first
largest absolute eigenvalues of the market for the 2006 state parliament elections in
Baden-Württemberg in Germany
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































128 7. Application in Prediction Markets
Figure 7.71: Total moneyflow network for user 1922 (username ’elfriede’) with the
strength of moneyflows visualised by numbers showing the difference of inbound and
outbound flow
Figure 7.72: Total moneyflow network for user 1816 (username ’henning’) with the
strength of the difference of moneyflows visualised by strength of ties
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7.2.2 Elections for the National Parliament in Switzerland
2007
Like the previous market, the market for the national parliament elections (Na-
tionalrat) in Switzerland in 2007 was not disturbed during runtime by the system
operators. This is noteworthy as massive and continuous price manipulations took
place which put the market and the results into a wrong perspective. The liberal
stance on market surveillance was supported by the liberal character of the media
partner (Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online) who chose to handle the manipulation by
journalistic means. In the areas of online and print, the media partner reported on
the manipulations within the market and the fact that manipulating traders would
be excluded from the lottery, as it was also stated in the terms and conditions for the
market system. As in the market described before, manipulating traders were not
blocked from trading during runtime and were not informed about their exclusion.
The participants were mainly customers of the media partner.
Market opening 2007-09-11 10:00:00
Market close 2007-10-21 12:00:00
Number of traders (at least one sell or buy transaction) 511 traders
Number of traders (at least one sell transaction) 310 traders
Number of traders (at least one buy transaction) 487 traders
Number of transactions 16, 421 transactions
Number of shares 8 shares
Average volume per trade 350.7 shares
Average moneyflow per trade 3, 781.4 MU
Moneyflow in total 62, 093, 811 MU
Shareflow in total 5, 759, 656 shares
Table 7.12: Statistical Data of the 2007 national parliament elections in Switzerland
7.2.2.1 Analysis
Finding information on price manipulation in prediction markets we follow the pat-
tern description in Section 6.2.3 which proposes to analyse the shareflow network
(cp. Section 6.1.4) of the share that is supposed to be manipulated. In the resulting
eigensystem analysis of this transaction data the patterns show up in the way intro-
duced in Section 6.2 and in the simulation in Section 7.1.3. The eigensystem analysis
results are illustrated by parts of the eigensystem in Table 7.13, the eigenvectors in
colour table visualisation in Figure 7.74, the normed real and absolute eigenvalues
distribution in Figures 7.75 and 7.76, the cumulated variance plot in Figure 7.77
and the eigenvectors with the cluster algorithm introduced in Section 5.3.3 applied.
As for the network data gathered in the described prediction market for the Swiss
national parliament it was obvious during the active period of the market that es-
pecially the price of the smallest party in the market (Grünliberale Partei GLP in
Basel) was quite different from the values of the polls and, last but not least, the
final result of the election where the final market price was 5.76 MU compared to
the final share price of 1.40






Figure 7.73: Prices of the market for the 2007 national parliament elections in
Switzerland
In the analysis results the second eigenvalue pair showed a strong inbound pattern
on trader 3224 whose inbound and outbound connections are given in Figures 7.79
and 7.80. In the clustering of the eigensystem this trader appears in the second
cluster as central vertex which is visualised in Figure 7.78 and can be found in the
upper left, second red box, as the eigenvector components are ordered by the clusters
and their structure within as described in Section 5.3.3. This central structure of
trader 3224 within the shareflow network hints at a price manipulation which is even
more probable by the comparison of the inbound and outbound networks shown in
Figures 7.79 and 7.80.
λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4 λ5 λ6 λ7
80036.10 -80032.60 43524.80 -41968.30 36415.00 -30059.00 29495.70
λ8 λ9 λ10 λ11 λ12 λ13 λ14
-25525.40 19535.40 -18481.50 18440.80 14301.90 -13074.50 -12623.80
λ15 λ16 λ17 λ18 λ19 λ20 λ21
-9061.48 8626.6 -7473.57 7202.77 -6590.15 6556.27 6270.35
Table 7.13: First 21 largest absolute eigenvalues
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Figure 7.75: Normed eigenvalues of the shareflow network for the GLP-share of the
2007 national parliament elections in Switzerland









Figure 7.76: Normed eigenvalues of the shareflow network for the GLP-share of the
2007 national parliament elections in Switzerland with absolute values
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Figure 7.77: Cumulated variance of the shareflow network for the GLP-share of
the 20 first largest absolute eigenvalues of the 2007 national parliament elections in
Switzerland



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.2. Real World Market Data 135
Figure 7.79: Inbound shareflow network of share ’GLP’ for user 3224 with the
strength of shareflow visualised by numbers showing the cumulated shareflow
Figure 7.80: Outbound shareflow network of share ’GLP’ for user 3224 with the
strength of shareflow visualised by numbers showing the cumulated shareflow
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7.3 Discussion
By the analyses accomplished within this chapter the effectiveness of the analysis
method from Chapter 6 could be demonstrated. Market transaction data with the
specific patterns of Section 6.2 introduced separately were generated and analysed.
In the results of these analyses the pattern structure was clearly discoverable by the
procedures introduced in 6.3 based upon the properties within the resulting data
eigensystem described in Section 6.2.
For identifying the specific patterns within real market transaction data, the net-
works of interest were built from the market system data and analysed in a similar
manner to the simulated data. As a result the network data put into the analysis
was split with the single patterns being extracted. In conclusion to the real data
put into the analysis, the separate extraction of traders with a manipulator’s char-
acteristic directly from the network flows stored in the database came up with the
similar traders and trader groups, respectively, assuring the assumed suspicion of
the trader acting irregular.
As all analysis techniques within this work were presented in a research context, it
is useful to give some remarks on certain aspects of a proper application in other
settings or domains. The remarks are arranged in their assignment to the aspects
software and programming, network characteristics denoting primarily the charac-
teristics of transaction networks built from prediction markets, but transferable to
other network definitions, and systematic failures in the domain of prediction mar-
kets but also transferable to other market domains.
• Software and Programming
◦ As the numerical precision of the common software calculation packages
may be very different and usually not well documented, analyses have
to be carried out carefully with being aware about the precision of the
respective package used e.g. the amount of digits up to which two eigen-
values are distinguishable. This holds also for the internal calculation
procedures in the software where one has to be aware of i.e. different
norming in certain stages of the eigensystem calculation.
◦ One major aspect in the choice of the software framework used for the
analysis should be the aspect of real time mining of the data. The analysis
of this work was conducted with static data after the end of a market.
In a second step this could be taken closer to the real time mining by
applying the static calculations to time slices of the transaction network
data, but true real time mining besides a good hardware configuration
makes high demands on the software used and especially the efficiency
and stability of the algorithms of the mathematical solvers used.
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• Network Characteristics
◦ As transaction networks evolve over time the assumed state of a complete
graph structure for a well functioning market is reached only after a cer-
tain time of market activity. In the case of traders allowed to participate
in the market after market start this is even more difficult to achieve. In
the case the networks are not well defined the supposed analysis tech-
nique may leave manipulations undiscovered as the regular trading itself
would appear like manipulative actions thus similar to the real manipula-
tions. Depending on the configuration of the market, complete structures
within the observed network can be achieved by only analysing certain
time slices of the network which hold only partial information of the net-
work, but enough data to discover the proposed manipulation structures.
Furthermore, a good extract of partial data can also result in the manip-
ulative structure to show up in a quite clearer way as the manipulative
transactions are not ’covered’ by regular trades from other time slices of
the transaction network.
◦ Manipulative traders may cover their irregular actions by regular ones.
This is especially the case for regular traders that only perform a small
amount of manipulations. Also here the analysis of parts of the transac-
tion networks may help to discover these transaction structures.
◦ The basic assumption in Section 7.1.3 that a market is quite even in its
degree and flow distribution can be touched not only by manipulative
traders but also fundamental or arbitrage traders. Their actions may
overlap with the patterns of manipulative traders introduced within this
work in certain network types. Thus along with a semantic verification
of the plausibility of the result this fact should be considered.
• Systematic failures (usually common to all manipulation detection systems)
◦ If a market system is confronted especially with price manipulations in a
large scale, trading may get stuck, because none of the target shares is
available on the market anymore. In such a situation analyses of trans-
action networks give results only up to the point in time trading was
disrupted. In this case an analysis of networks which also considers not
executed orders could be helpful.
◦ Wrong analysis results could appear if in transactions belonging to a
money transfer pattern the wrong ’recipient’ is matched to the starting
offer of the manipulator. This may happen by chance if a regular trader
acts with an adequate offer at the same time as the manipulator does.
◦ Generally, the final decision about a trader being a price manipulator is
rather difficult as the trader’s intentions can only be assumed.

8. Conclusion and Outlook
This work describes the incentive systems of a prediction market, incentive com-
patibility and the reasons, effects and detection of irregular trading behaviour that
follows the absence of incentive compatibility. This behaviour is analysed and clas-
sified by the the different transaction patterns of traders within such a system with
respect to the incentives given by the system. To balance incentive incompatibility
these traders can then be excluded from active trading or in a market with play
money from participation in the lottery in the end depending on the market opera-
tor’s strategy.
To solve the problem of detecting the traders acting according to the introduced
manipulation patterns this work focuses on the trading characteristics of irregular
traders in different transaction networks that can be extracted from a prediction
market system. As the used eigensystem analysis approach, emanating from the
area of social network analysis, focuses on analysing networks in terms of central
structures the transaction data relevant to a certain trading pattern is described in
central structures. This is achieved by first disaggregating the total market trans-
action data into subnetworks of certain entities like money and shares and then
describing the manipulative actions as centralised structures. Procedures for finding
the patterns and, therefore, the relevant traders are given as well as a method for
clustering the resulting eigensystem by inherent metric information. The proposed
analysis technique is applied to simulated network data providing clear transaction
patterns in the network definition. Finally the transaction data of two public pre-
diction markets that were conducted within the scope of the research question are
analysed. The results of this analyses give a clear insight into the trader behaviour
and separate the ’good’ ones from the relevant ’bad’ ones that disturb the incentive
compatibility. Especially by the application of the clustering technique the cliques
associated to the pattern and its initiating trader are discovered.
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As a new tool in the forecasting business, prediction markets operate in areas nowa-
days forecasting technologies can hardly compete with. Even if carried out online
traditional opinion polls do not offer aspects like the real time operation a continuous
market system can provide. Additionally, prediction markets provide a high involve-
ment of the trader which is usually not present or even not achievable by traditional
prediction tools. But as prediction markets are implemented in open world scenarios
with play money they may suffer from a gambling character where the system and
results could be considered as systematically being not serious. This impression is
even strengthened if the market predictions are wrong. So as prediction markets
achieve more public interest and gain attractiveness it is essential that they provide
clear predictions and, therefore, are recognised as a valid and serious forecasting
tool. The essential aspect to provide an attractive and well functioning prediction
market system is a working incentive system where incentive incompatibility and its
systematic result (fraud and manipulation) is balanced by sufficient arrangements to
increase the cost of accomplishing these actions for the manipulator like prosecution
and penalisation of these irregular actions. This work gives a new way of detecting
irregular trading behaviour by means of an eigensystem analysis technique.
In the context of this work the presented methods for fraud detection were set
up in a research domain. Continuing the proposed ideas it would be useful to
implement the presented methods in a robust system which serves the application
domain adequately. Crucial in implementing is the efficient data procession in the
case of the eigensystem calculations which requires a good eigensolver package at low
algorithmical costs. For the methods analysing the eigensystems the main challenge
is surely the level of detail the structures can be detected. Especially in a real time
mining environment the differentiation between noise (regular) trading patterns and
the irregular ones is hard to distinguish as the upcoming network is unknown in each
point in time before the market closes. An efficient usage of subsequent time windows
to calculate eigensystems on the static states of the network could be a starting
point to this analysis. By an elegant comparison among these time slices even a
continuous picture of the evolving network could be drawn. This could be enhanced
by overlapping time windows. Within the domain of markets the unmatched orders
could be used as another source for information that tracks back to the full set of
users actions in the market system and could give a deeper insight into the trading
behaviour and manipulative acting. As this work only uses cumulated numbers of
shares or moneyflows it could also give more insight into the actions of a trader to
use information like shareflow and moneyflow with respect to the number of trades
or price of a share in the analysis.
Regarding the incentive compatibility and the incentive systems of prediction mar-
kets in real world applications it is necessary to get a deeper insight into the be-
havioural mechanisms like the impact of fraud onto regular traders of the markets.
This is essential to provide good quality solutions in the control of incentive incom-
patible status of systems and thus good prediction quality and error measuring as
the results of such markets. As introduced in the motivation to this work in Chap-
ter 1 prediction markets provide a brilliant combination of social sciences, economic
research and information technology that makes it possible to experience certain
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domains (i.e. the political one) from a different but modern point of view. Thus
a solid formal basis for dealing with the mentioned issues is crucial to the public
perception of prediction markets as a reliable prediction instrument.

A. Abbreviations and Symbols
Within this work the following conventions are maintained if not stated otherwise.
Basic graph entities and sets
S = {s1, . . . , sn} Set of shares
V = {v1, v2, . . . , vm} Abstract set of vertices
V T Set of traders
E = {e1, e2, . . . , eo} Abstract set of edges
EM Set of moneyflow edges
EM
s
Set of moneyflow edges for a certain share s ∈ S
EQ Set of shareflow edges
ω(vi, vj) = wij with i, j ∈ V Applied weighting function and weight of edge
between vertex vi and vertex vj
Graphs and measures
G = {V,E, ω} Basic Graph as described in Equation 4.1
GM =
{
V T , EM , ωM
}




V T , EQ, ωQ
}








Graph of sharewise shareflow network for share
s ∈ S as described in Section 6.1.4
δdeg(v) Degree of a vertex v (all edges incident to ver-
tex v as described in Equation 4.2
δindeg(v) Degree (inbound) of a vertex v (all edges incident
to vertex v and directed to vertex v) as described
in Equation 4.3
δoutdeg(v) Degree (outbound) of a vertex v (all edges inci-
dent to vertex v and directed away from vertex v)
as described in Equation 4.4
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δinflow(vj) =
∑
vi ∈ V \ vj ω(vi, vj) Abstract inbound flow of a vertex(sum of all flows
of edges incident to vertex vi and directed to ver-
tex vi) as described in Equation 4.7
δoutflow(vi) =
∑
vj ∈ V \ vi ω(vi, vj) Abstract outbound flow of a vertex (sum of all
flows of edges incident to vertex vi and directed
away from vertex vi) as described in Equation 4.6
General Mathematical Notation
ϕ (z1) The phase information of z1 ∈ C
ϕ (z1, z2) The angle between z1 and z2 with z1, z2 ∈ C
a Vector a
a∗ Complex conjugate transpose of vector a
ai i
th element of vector a
ai Complex conjugate of the i
th element of vector a
B Set of vectors
bi i
th vector within the set of vectors B
bij j
th element of the ith vector within the set of
vectors B
C Matrix C
Ct Transpose of matrix C
C∗ Complex conjugate transpose of matrix C
Mathematical Notation
Λ Set of all eigenvalues (Spectrum)
λi Eigenvalue i
X Set of all eigenvectors
xi Eigenvector i
xij j
th eigenvector component of eigenvector i
Abbreviations and Textual Concerns
MU Monetary Unit
moneyflow Flow of money
shareflow Flow of shares
e.g. exempli gratia; for example
cp. compare to
i.e. id est; that is
et al. et alii; and others
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ment elections in Baden-Württemberg in Germany . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.70 Visualisation of the global moneyflow network of the eigensystem of
the market for the 2006 state parliament elections in Baden-Württemberg
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As a new tool in the forecasting business, predic tion 
markets operate in areas current forecasting techno lo­
gies can hardly compete with. Even traditional opini­
on polls carried out online do not offer aspects like 
the real time operation a continuous market system can 
provide. Additionally, prediction markets provide a 
high involvement of the trader, usually not present or 
even achievable by traditional prediction tools. But as 
prediction markets are implemented with play money in 
open world scenarios, they may suffer from a gambling 
character where the system and results could be consi­
dered as not being systematically serious. This impres­
sion is strengthened further if the market predictions 
are wrong. So as prediction markets achieve more public 
interest and gain attractiveness, it is essential that 
they provide clear predictions and, are therefore re­
cognised as a valid and serious forecasting tool. The 
essential aspect in providing an attractive and well 
functioning prediction market system is incentive com­
patibility. Fraud and manipulation are the systematic 
results of incentive incompatibility, which, if pre­
sent, have to be detected and balanced. This can be 
accomplished by sufficient arrangements to increase the 
cost of carrying out these manipulative actions.
This work gives a new way of detecting irregular tra­
ding behaviour by means of a generalised eigensystem 
analysis technique, used mainly in the area of the so­
cial network analysis. Derived from incentive incompa­
ti ble situations, the motivations for manipulations 
are described on a formal level. The manipulations are 
expressed as abstract trading patterns which can be de­
tected in certain types of transaction networks within 
a prediction market system.
